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Abstract
We study the e⁄ects of globalization on risk sharing and welfare. Like previous literature, we
assume that countries cannot commit to repay their debts. Unlike previous literature, we assume
that countries cannot discriminate between domestic and foreign creditors when repaying their
debts. This creates novel interactions between domestic and international trade in assets. (i)
Increases in domestic trade raise the bene￿ts of enforcement and facilitate international trade.
In fact, in our setup countries can obtain international risk sharing even in the absence of default
penalties. (ii) Increases in foreign trade ￿ i.e. globalization￿raise the costs of enforcement and
hamper domestic trade. As a result, globalization may worsen domestic risk sharing and lower
welfare. We show how these e⁄ects depend on various characteristics of tradable goods and
explore the roles of borrowing limits, debt renegotiations, and trade policy.
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yCREI and Universitat Pompeu Fabra (www.crei.cat).What is the e⁄ect of globalization on risk sharing and welfare? This is an old question in
international economics that has gained increased relevance as the world economy becomes more
integrated. Textbook predictions notwithstanding, there is a widespread and growing perception
that globalization is making the world riskier and that this reduces welfare. Newbery and Stiglitz
(1984) provided an early and in￿ uential example of how this might happen. They modelled glob-
alization as a reduction in trade costs in a small open economy. Before globalization, shocks to
production lead to o⁄setting movements in goods prices that stabilize individual incomes. After
globalization, shocks to production no longer a⁄ect goods prices and individual incomes become
volatile. Newbery and Stiglitz showed that the costs of this worsening in risk sharing might exceed
the gains from goods trade leading to a welfare loss.1
Newbery and Stiglitz did not explain why, in their example, individuals cannot insure them-
selves against income risk. And knowing this turns out to be crucial for their argument, as Dixit
(1987, 1989a, and 1989b) has forcefully argued in a series of seminal papers. Assuming that individ-
uals have private information about their actions (moral hazard), the state of nature (imperfectly
observed outcomes), or their type (adverse selection), Dixit showed that globalization is welfare
improving unless we add exogenous restrictions on the nature of private contracts that are avail-
able or the sort of government policies that are feasible. The intuition for this result is simple: if
globalization raises the demand for insurance, private arrangements and government policies that
allow individuals to insure will be adopted. Once we allow markets and governments to optimally
react, globalization is welfare improving.2
In this paper, we adopt the alternative but complementary view that markets are incomplete
because of enforcement problems.3 These problems arise when governments have a preference for
their own citizens and cannot commit to force them to repay their debts. This time-inconsistency
problem, known as sovereign risk, is widely regarded as a reason why insurance against aggregate
risk is imperfect. Moreover, we shall show here that sovereign risk can also explain why insurance
against individual risk is imperfect even when all information is public. Unlike Dixit, we ￿nd that
the availability of insurance might decline even if globalization increases its demand and markets
and governments react optimally to changes in the environment. The reason is that globalization
also increases the severity of the underlying friction. This did not happen in Dixit￿ s models since
1Eaton and Grossman (1985) made a similar point.
2This view has also played an important role in the recent debate on the e⁄ects of globalization on the size of
governments. Rodrik (1998) argues that globalization increases individual risk and, in the absence of appropriate
insurance markets, governments must grow to deal with the increased need for social insurance mechanisms. See
Epifani and Gancia (2008) for an alternative view.
3Private information is a major source of market incompleteness, but it cannot cannot account for the lack of
insurance against aggregate risk which is observable. See Lewis (1999) for a useful survey of the evidence.
1the informational frictions he considers are not a⁄ected by globalization.
A crude example helps build intuition for our results. Consider a world with two regions:
Home and Foreign; each containing two individuals: Hans and Fritz. All individuals have the same
concave utility function, u(￿), and receive a stochastic income. There are four equiprobable states
of nature:
Endowments
state 1 state 2 state 3 state 4
HH 1 + " + ￿ 1 + " ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ " 1 ￿ "
HF 1 + " ￿ ￿ 1 + " + ￿ 1 ￿ " 1 ￿ "
FH 1 ￿ " 1 ￿ " 1 + " + ￿ 1 + " ￿ ￿
FF 1 ￿ " 1 ￿ " 1 + " ￿ ￿ 1 + " + ￿
where HH stands for Home Hans and so on. It is straightforward to interpret the income of
each individual as the sum of three components: (i) the average, i.e. 1; (ii) a regional shock, i.e.
f￿";+"g; and (iii) an individual shock, i.e. f￿￿;0;+￿g. There exists a full set of Arrow-Debreu
securities that can be used to obtain insurance againts these shocks. For these securities to be
valuable, however, governments must enforce payments. For instance, if HH sells an Arrow-Debreu
security that pays in state 1, the Home government must force HH to pay once state 1 is realized.
Otherwise, HH cannot sell this security in the ￿rst place and markets are incomplete.
Before globalization, trade leads to domestic risk sharing if payments are enforced:
Consumptions with domestic Risk Sharing
state 1 state 2 state 3 state 4
HH 1 + " 1 + " 1 ￿ " 1 ￿ "
HF 1 + " 1 + " 1 ￿ " 1 ￿ "
FH 1 ￿ " 1 ￿ " 1 + " 1 + "
FF 1 ￿ " 1 ￿ " 1 + " 1 + "
But do governments have an incentive to enforce payments? Assume that (i) governments cannot
commit and must choose enforcement after the state of nature is realized, and (ii) governments
cannot discriminate and must enforce all payments or none. Then, domestic risk sharing is an
equilibrium if governments prefer ex-post the allocation that results from enforcing payments to
the allocation that would result from not doing so. For instace, if governments maximize average
utility, they would enforce payments in all states only if:
u(1 + ") ￿
u(1 + " + ￿) + u(1 + " ￿ ￿)
2
2The concavity of u(￿) ensures this, and domestic risk sharing is thus an equilibrium. But this
equilibrium is not unique. Not trading is best response for individuals if there is no enforcement.
And not enforcing is best response for the government if there is no trade. Therefore, in the
absence of commitment, there is always a ￿market collapse￿equilibrium in which there is neither
enforcement nor trade.
After globalization, trade also leads to international risk sharing if payments are enforced:
Consumptions with domestic and international Risk Sharing
state 1 state 2 state 3 state 4
HH 1 1 1 1
HF 1 1 1 1
FH 1 1 1 1
FF 1 1 1 1
But now the condition for governments to enforce in all states of nature is more stringent:
u(1) ￿
u(1 + " + ￿) + u(1 + " ￿ ￿)
2
In particular, concavity of the utility function is no longer enough to guarantee enforcement. When
this condition fails, the ￿market collapse￿equilibrium is unique and globalization lowers welfare.
This crude example illustrates the key enforcement trade-o⁄ that underlies our theory. Before
globalization, governments ￿nd enforcement desirable because payments among domestic residents
contribute to domestic risk sharing and raise welfare. After globalization, this positive e⁄ect of
enforcement is still there. But there is now also a negative e⁄ect since payments from domestic to
foreign residents lower domestic consumption and welfare. This is why the enforcement condition
becomes more stringent. Enforcement is only possible if the gains from domestic trade are large
relative to the gains from international trade, i.e. if ￿ is large relative to ". In section 2, we provide
a full characterization of this enforcement trade-o⁄ in a setup with many goods, many individuals,
and many states of nature. Unlike this example, our setup allows for gradual changes in the extent
of both globalization and market incompleteness.
We then exploit this enforcement trade-o⁄ to study the e⁄ects of globalization in section 3. In
our setup globalization brings the usual gains from goods trade. It also a⁄ects the incentives to
enforce and therefore the degree of market incompleteness. On average, globalization increases pay-
ments from domestic to foreign residents, worsening enforcement. But globalization also a⁄ects the
terms of trade and therefore the properties of regional and individual income shocks, i.e. f￿";+"g
3and f￿￿;0;+￿g. Through this channel, globalization sometimes increases payments among domes-
tic residents, or even reduces payments from domestic to foreign residents. When this happens,
enforcement improves.4;5
There are two externalities that play a key role in our arguments. The ￿rst one is that indi-
viduals do not consider how their trades a⁄ect enforcement, leading them to borrow so much from
abroad that governments prefer not to enforce. One might think that imposing borrowing limits
would solve this problem. The second externality is that governments do not consider how their en-
forcement decisions a⁄ect foreigners, leading them to not enforce even if the foreign costs outweigh
the domestic bene￿ts. It might seem therefore that the problem could be avoided if governments
could pay each other ex-post to enforce. We show in section 4, however, that the negative e⁄ects of
globalization on market incompleteness remain even if governments adopt optimal borrowing limits
and are free to negotiate enforcement among themselves. We also show that attempts to ￿ght back
globalization with trade policy are futile if governments lack commitment.
There is an extensive literature on sovereign risk that developed in response to the debt crises
of the early 1980￿ s. Like us, this literature assumes that governments cannot commit to enforce.
Unlike us, this literature implicitly assumes that enforcement is discriminatory and all domestic
payments are enforced.6;7 In our setup, discriminatory enforcement would lead to vastly di⁄erent
results. In the example above, for instance, governments would always enforce domestic payments
but never foreign ones. Globalization would have no e⁄ects at all!
The results in this paper move the theory of sovereign risk towards greater empirical relevance
both in terms of its assumptions and its results. Regarding assumptions, today￿ s institutional
setup for international borrowing favors our assumption of non-discriminatory enforcement.8 Gov-
ernments borrow from abroad mostly by selling bonds which are traded in deep secondary markets,
while liberalized capital accounts permit the private sector to access international ￿nancial mar-
kets directly or through an increasing variety of ￿nancial intermediaries. In such an environment,
4The existing literature on international risk sharing has often emphasized the role of the terms of trade and
its response to shocks. In addition to Newbery and Stiglitz (1984) and Eaton and Grossman (1985), see Cole and
Obstfeld (1991), Perri and Heathcote (2002), Kraay and Ventura (2002), and Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2008).
5McLaren and Newman (2002), Levchenko (2005), and Dixit (2003) deal with some of these issues but model
globalization di⁄erently from us.
6This is a consequence of adopting the representative-agent framework. See Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Grossman
and van Huyck (1988), Bulow and Rogo⁄ (1989a and 1989b), FernÆndez and Rosenthal (1990), Atkeson (1991), Cole,
Dow, and English (1995), Cole and Kehoe (1997), Kletzer and Wright (2000), Kehoe and Perri (2002), Wright (2002),
and Amador (2003). See Eaton and FernÆndez (1995) for an excellent survey.
7Kremer and Mehta (2000), Rappoport (2005), Brutti (2008), Gennaioli and Martin (2009), and Guembel and
Sussman (forthcoming) also adopt the non-discrimination assumption and study the implications of this trade-o⁄ for
the determination of government debt and tax policy.
8The assumption of discriminatory enforcement used by earlier literature was justi￿ed in the 1970s and early
1980s. Then, governments borrowed abroad almost exclusively from foreign banks using syndicated loans, while the
private sector was largely shut out from international ￿nancial markets. This institutional setup facilitates ex-post
discrimination, as governments can choose not to pay foreign banks without interfering with domestic asset trade.
4governments￿ability to discriminate between domestic and foreign creditors is seriously limited.
In the case of bonds and stocks, discriminating against foreigners is di¢ cult because they can sell
these assets to domestic residents in secondary markets.9 When asset trade is intermediated, dis-
crimination might not be possible since governments typically do not know the nationality of the
clients of banks, mutual funds, and other ￿nancial intermediaries that hold domestic debt.10 Even
if this information were available, governments might still not be able to control how these inter-
mediaries distribute their losses among domestic and foreign clients. Finally, courts often abide by
equal-treatment rules that limit the possibility of discrimination based on nationality.11
Regarding results, this paper moves the theory of sovereign risk towards greater empirical
relevance by allowing it to account for two types of interactions between domestic and international
trade in assets. The ￿rst one is that increases in domestic trade raise the bene￿ts of enforcement
and facilitate international trade. This is consistent with the contrasting experience of emerging
markets and industrial countries that have undergone ￿nancial liberalization. Contrary to the
former, industrial countries have been able to take greater advantage of international markets
without su⁄ering destabilizing e⁄ects.12 The second interaction is that increases in foreign trade
raise the costs of enforcement and hamper domestic trade. There is by now substantial empirical
evidence that this is the case for emerging markets and a growing theoretical literature that tries to
explain why this is so.13 We argue here that both interactions can be the result of a single friction,
namely, sovereign risk.
9For a thorough analysis of the role of secondary markets in the presence of sovereign risk see Broner, Martin,
and Ventura (2006 and 2008).
10For the case of public debt, the IMF￿ s Global Financial Stability Report (April 2006, pp. 95-96) says: ￿It is
di¢ cult to obtain complete data on the composition of investors in sovereign bonds. Unlike bilateral, multilateral, or
bank loans, neither issuers nor other data gatherers publish comprehensive decompositions of commercial investors in
emerging market sovereign debt. Some sovereigns have needed and compiled this information sporadically, for exam-
ple, in the context of voluntary debt swaps or distressed debt restructurings, but the full composition of commercial
investors in emerging markets debt is rarely known.￿The report goes on explaining the di¢ culties of obtaining this
information and therefore justifying that ￿...only a handful of countries could provide detailed information on investor
composition.￿The report focuses on public debt, and it seems reasonable to assume that governments have even less
information on the ￿nancial intermediaries that hold private debt.
11Not surprisingly, there are many instances in which governments do not discriminate. With few exceptions,
episodes of default on government debts have a⁄ected all bondholders. See Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2007).
The same holds true in the case of generalized defaults on debts issued by ￿rms and/or banks. A recent and very
visible example is the case of the ￿pesi￿caci￿n￿of bank deposits and loans in Argentina in 2001, which induced a
generalized default that a⁄ected all depositors.
12This di⁄erential impact of ￿nancial integration has been analyzed by a number of papers. For instance, Broner
and Rigobon (2006) show that capital ￿ ows to emerging markets are much more volatile than those to industrial
countries, that this di⁄erence cannot be accounted for by macroeconomic fundamentals, and that it is associated with
weak domestic ￿nancial markets. This interaction is explored theoretically by Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001),
Tirole (2003), Broner, Martin, and Ventura (2006 and 2008), and Arellano and Kocherlakota (2008).
13With respect to the empirical evidence, it has been found that banking crises and reductions in credit to the
private sector are associated with globalization (e.g. Diaz-Alejandro (1985) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999)),
sovereign default (e.g. International Monetary Fund (2002) and Arteta and Hale (2008)), and currency crises (e.g.
Glick and Hutchison (2001)). With respect to the theory, see Boyd and Smith (1997), Chang and Velasco (1999),
Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2004), Matsuyama (2004, 2007), Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki (2006), Daniel and
Jones (2007), and Mendoza and Yue (2008).
51 A benchmark model of risk sharing
In this section, we introduce the economic environment we use throughout the paper. This is a
world in which all individuals are ex-ante identical since they all have the same preferences over
di⁄erent goods and they all have access to an ex-ante identical project. The return to this project
is random and this generates ex-post di⁄erences in the quantity and types of goods produced. This
creates a role for markets in helping individuals to pool or share risks. We ￿rst examine a situation
in which these markets work well. This case will serve as a useful benchmark when we introduce
enforcement problems in Section 2.
1.1 Preferences and technology
The world economy contains two regions: Home and Foreign, indexed by j 2 fH;Fg. Both regions
have identical population size, normalized to 1. Let IW be the set of inhabitants of this world,
indexed by i, and let IH and IF be the sets of Home and Foreign residents, respectively. Naturally,
IH [ IF = IW and IH \ IF = ?. Let j(i) denote the region where individual i resides. The world
and its inhabitants last two periods, which we refer to as youth and old age. There is no uncertainty
about youth, but there is uncertainty regarding old age. Let S be the set of all possible states of
nature during old age. This set includes all the relevant aspects of the world economy that are not
known during youth. We assume that, once realized, all individuals observe the state of nature.
We denote by ￿s the probability at youth of state s 2 S occurring during old age.14
There is a continuum of goods, indexed by z 2 [0;1]. A fraction ￿ of these goods can be
transported between regions at negligible cost. We refer to these goods as ￿tradable.￿The rest of
the goods cannot be transported across regions and we refer to them as ￿nontradable.￿The goods
are indexed so that tradable goods correspond to low indices, i.e. z 2 [0;￿], and nontradable goods
correspond to high indices, i.e. z 2 (￿;1]. When considering two alternative speci￿cations, we shall
say that the world is more globalized the higher ￿ is.
Utility is derived only from old age consumption and individuals are expected-utility maximizers.
Let cis(z) be the quantity of good z consumed by individual i in state s. The objective function of




lncis(z) ￿ dz for all s 2 S and i 2 IW, (1)
14With some abuse of language, we shall refer to ￿s as the probability of state s even though for continuous
state-spaces we are really referring to the probability density function.




￿s ￿ uis for all i 2 IW. (2)
A standard feature of dynamic decision problems is that the objective function of agents (individuals
or governments) varies over time. This gives rise to a standard time-inconsistency problem that
plays a central role in this paper.
During youth, individuals own a project located in their region. Projects deliver a bundle of
goods during old age. We refer to this bundle as the production of the project of individual i or,
for short, as the production of individual i. Let yis(z) be the production of good z by individual




i2Ij yis(z) for j 2 fH;Fg be the regional average
productions of good z in state s, while yW
s (z) ￿ 0:5 ￿ (yH
s (z) + yF
s (z)) be the corresponding world
average.
There is full symmetry between and within regions. First, if there exists a state s with ￿s = ￿
and given sets of productions in Home fyis(￿)gi2IH = Y and in Foreign fyis(￿)gi2IF = Y , then there
exists a corresponding state s0 with ￿s0 = ￿ and sets of productions in Home fyis0(￿)gi2IH = Y and
in Foreign fyis0(￿)gi2IF = Y . Second, for every pair of individuals i and i0 residing in the same
region, if there exists a state s with ￿s = ￿ and given sets of productions in Home and Foreign in
which yis(￿) = y(￿), then there also exists a corresponding state s0 with ￿s0 = ￿ and the same sets
of productions in Home and Foreign in which yi0s0(￿) = y(￿). These assumptions imply that ex-ante
productions are the same in both regions and for all individuals within a region. Of course, this
need not be the case ex-post and this is why there are gains from trade.
In this world, markets allow individuals to transfer consumption across goods and across states
of nature. Some trades might involve the exchange of goods during old age, while some others
might involve the exchange of promises during youth to deliver goods during old age. We refer to
the former as ￿goods￿trade and the latter as ￿asset￿trade. We start by considering the benchmark
case of complete markets. As usual, by ￿complete￿it is meant that the existing set of markets
allows all pairs of individuals to carry out all mutually desired trades. There are many possible
ways of organizing markets that ensure this. For convenience, we consider a sequential formulation
of markets: during youth there are asset (or forward) markets where individuals can trade promises
to deliver one unit of the numeraire good in state s in any of the two regions; and during old age
there are goods (or spot) markets where individuals can exchange the di⁄erent goods. Intuitively,
asset markets are used to distribute income across states of nature, while goods markets are used
7to distribute consumption across goods.15
As usual, it is useful to construct the competitive equilibrium recursively, going backwards in
time. During old age, individuals take their income as given and choose how to distribute their
consumption across goods so as to maximize utility. During youth, individuals choose how to
distribute their income across states of nature so as to maximize their expected utility. We study
each of these choices in turn.
1.2 Goods markets
During old age, the state of nature is known and only goods markets are open. Let p
j
s(z) be the
price of one unit of good z in state s in region j. Let yis be the value of the production of individual




s (z)￿yis(z)￿dz; and let xis be the value of the assets held by individual




i2Ij yis for j 2 fH;Fg be the regional average values of production in
state s, while yW
s ￿ 0:5 ￿ (yH
s + yF





for j 2 fH;Fg be the regional average values of assets in state s. We need not de￿ne the world
average value of assets since these are nothing but promises and their average value must be zero.




s (z) ￿ cis(z) ￿ dz ￿ yis + xis for all s 2 S and i 2 IW. (3)
The budget constraint states that the value of consumption cannot exceed income, which in turn
consists of the value of production plus the value of assets held.







s (z) and pH
s (z) = pF
s (z) ￿ pW




s(z) for all z 2 (￿;1], s 2 S, and j 2 fH;Fg. (5)
Equations (4) and (5) state that supplies of the di⁄erent goods must equal their demands. For those
goods that are tradable, international arbitrage ensures that the prices of a given good delivered
at Home and Foreign are equalized. This international arbitrage does not operate for nontradable
15This sequential formulation of markets is sometimes referred to as a Radner equilibrium. The classic Arrow-
Debreu equilibrium assumes instead that there is a set of forward markets during youth where individuals can trade
promises to deliver one unit of any good in state s in any of the two regions. The Arrow-Debreu equilibrium
minimizes the use of spot markets, while the sequential or Radner equilibrium minimizes the use of forward markets.
If all markets work well, both equilibria deliver the same allocations. This equivalence breaks down however once we
introduce sovereign risk in the next section. This type of risk negatively a⁄ects the functioning of forward markets,
without a⁄ecting the functioning of spot markets. This provides incentives to minimize the use of forward markets
and justi￿es our choice of equilibrium.
8goods.
A competitive equilibrium during old age consists of a set of goods prices and quantities such
that individuals maximize their utility ￿ Equation (1)￿subject to their budget constraint ￿ Equation
(3)￿and goods markets clear ￿ Equations (4) and (5). Note that the state variables of the old-age
problem are individual productions fyis(￿)gi2IW and asset holdings fxisgi2IW.
We show that the equilibrium exists and is unique by construction. It follows from individual
maximization that consumption demands are given by cis(z) = (yis + xis)=p
j(i)
s (z) for all i 2 IW
and z 2 [0;1]. Substituting these demands into the market clearing conditions in Equations (4) and
(5) we ￿nd that prices are given by pW
s (z) = yW
s =yW



























s (z) if z 2(￿;1]
for all s 2 S, and i 2 IW. (6)
Equation (6) shows how Home and Foreign residents distribute their consumption across the dif-
ferent goods. In particular, individuals share goods in proportions that are directly related to their
incomes. For tradable goods, world production is shared according to world relative incomes. For
nontradable goods, regional production is shared according to regional relative incomes. We can





























for all s 2 S and i 2 IW, (7)



























for all s 2 S and j 2 fH;Fg. (8)
A region￿ s income increases with its relative production of tradables and with its assets.17
Equations (6), (7) and (8) provide a full description of the consumption allocation as a function
of the state variables of this problem, i.e. individual productions fyis(￿)gi2IW and asset holdings
fxisgi2IW. Individual productions are determined by nature, but asset holdings are determined by
trade during youth and we turn to this now.
16To see this, substitute prices into the de￿nition of yis.
17Note that assets increase income more than one-to-one if ￿ < 1. The reason is that assets shift purchasing power
from foreign to domestic residents. This raises the demand for domestic nontradable goods relative to foreign ones.
And this increases the value of domestic production relative to foreign. This additional e⁄ect of asset holdings on
incomes is well-known in the literature on the ￿transfer problem.￿
91.3 Asset markets
During youth, only asset markets are open. Let qs be the price of an asset that promises to deliver
one unit of the numeraire in state s, and let xis be the number of such assets held by individual i.
Therefore, the budget sets of the young are characterized by:
Z
s2S
qs ￿ xis ￿ 0 for all i 2 IW, (9)
xis ￿ ￿yis for all s 2 S and i 2 IW. (10)
Equation (9) is the budget constraint and says that purchases of assets must be ￿nanced by cor-
responding sales of other assets, while Equation (10) simply says that consumption must be non-
negative. Naturally, during youth asset markets must clear:
Z
i2IW
xis = 0 for all s 2 S. (11)
Equation (11) states that there is a zero net supply of all assets or promises.
A competitive equilibrium during youth consists of a set of asset prices and quantities such
that individuals maximize expected utility ￿ Equation (2)￿subject to their constraints ￿ Equations
(9) and (10)￿and asset markets clear ￿ Equation (11). When maximizing their utility, individuals
take as given how their individual consumption during old age depends on their individual asset
holdings.
We show again that this equilibrium exists and is unique by construction. Note that log pref-
erences imply that a young individual i will choose asset holdings fxisgs2S such that yis + xis =
￿￿1
i ￿ (￿s=qs) where ￿i is the Lagrange multiplier associated with individual i￿ s budget constraint.
Since all individuals are ex-ante identical (preferences and technology) and have access to the same
set of markets, they all have the same multiplier ￿i ￿ ￿ for all i 2 IW. Integrating this expression
over i 2 IW and using the market clearing conditions in Equation (11) we ￿nd ￿￿1 = (qs=￿s)￿yW
s .
As a result, we have:
xis = yW
s ￿ yis for all s 2 S and i 2 IW. (12)
Equation (12) provides the equilibrium asset holdings, i.e. fxisgi2IW. During old age income is
always equally distributed within and between regions.
We have now a full description of the complete-markets equilibrium. For a given set of individual
productions fyis(￿)gi2IW and asset holdings fxisgi2IW, Equations (6), (7) and (8) describe the
consumption allocation that come out of goods markets during old age. For a given set of individual
10productions fyis(￿)gi2IW, Equation (12) describes the asset holdings that come out from asset
markets during youth. We describe the welfare properties of this equilibrium next.
1.4 Domestic and international risk sharing with complete markets
Markets allow individuals to share production risks both within and between regions. We can
provide a sharper description of how this happens by decomposing production, yis(z), as follows:
yis(z) = ￿is(z) ￿ ￿j(i)
s (z) ￿ yW
s (z) for all z 2[0;1], s 2 S, and i 2 IW, (13)
where ￿is(z) ￿ yis(z)=y
j(i)
s (z) and ￿
j(i)
s (z) ￿ y
j(i)
s (z)=yW
s (z) for z 2 [0;1], s 2 S, and i 2 IW are the
individual and regional components of production respectively. By construction, these components
have a constant mean, i.e.
R
i2Ij ￿is(z) = 1 and 0:5￿(￿H
s (z)+￿F
s (z)) = 1 for all z 2 [0;1] and s 2 S.
We will refer to a (mean-preserving) spread in ￿is(z) and ￿
j(i)
s (z) as an increase in individual and
regional risk for good z respectively.







s (z) if z 2 [0;￿]
￿
j(i)
s (z) ￿ yW
s (z) if z 2(￿;1]
for all s 2 S, and i 2 IW, (14)

















￿ dz for any i 2 IW. (15)
Equations (14) and (15) provide a full description of consumption and welfare. There is perfect
domestic sharing of all goods, but only perfect international sharing of tradable ones. Naturally,
this is because it is not technologically possible to share nontradable goods across regions. Markets
work well, but they cannot overcome technological constraints. In fact, it is straightforward to
show that the complete-markets consumption allocations are ￿ ex-ante￿Pareto e¢ cient and strictly
Pareto dominate all other symmetric consumption allocations.19
Not surprisingly, welfare increases with world production of all goods yW
s (z). Moreover, Jensen￿ s
inequality shows that a mean-preserving spread in world production lowers welfare. Higher volatility
in world production cannot be diversi￿ed away and must lead one-to-one to higher volatility in
18All individuals enjoy the same ex-ante utility because of our symmetry assumptions.
19Since we shall focus exclusively on symmetric consumption allocations throughout the paper, we refer to those in
Equations (14) as ￿the￿Pareto e¢ cient consumption allocations, even though we recognize that there exist asymmetric
allocations that are also Pareto e¢ cient.
11individual consumption. Since individuals are risk averse, they su⁄er from this.
A feature of the complete-markets equilibrium is that welfare is not a⁄ected by an increase in
individual risk.20 Since there is perfect domestic sharing of all goods, the ￿ ex-post￿distribution
of production among individuals of the same region has no e⁄ects on individual consumption or
welfare.
Welfare is not a⁄ected by an increase in regional risk on tradable goods either, but welfare is
a⁄ected by an increase in regional risk on nontradable goods.21 Since there is perfect international
sharing of tradable goods, the ￿ ex-post￿distribution of tradable production between regions has no
e⁄ects on consumption or welfare. Since transport costs preclude international sharing of nontrad-
able goods, higher volatility of the regional component of their production must lead one-to-one to
higher volatility in the consumption of these goods and this lowers ex-ante utility.
This discussion provides a short but comprehensive description of the complete-markets equi-
librium. Goods and asset markets combine to allow individuals to share production risks. Given
technological constraints to trade, this is an ideal world. But this is too rosy a picture of asset
markets. There is a fundamental di⁄erence in the nature of goods and asset markets that the
complete-markets model ignores. In goods markets individuals trade commodities for commodi-
ties, while in asset markets individuals trade promises for promises. Unlike commodities, promises
are only valuable if individuals can commit to ful￿ll them later. We have assumed this implicitly
in the previous analysis. In the next section we relax this assumption.
2 Sovereign risk
The feasibility of the complete-markets consumption allocation rests on society￿ s ability to solve a
standard time-inconsistency problem. Even though individuals would like to commit ex-ante to pay
their debts, ex-post they have incentives not to do so and enjoy a higher level of consumption. Either
old individuals are not maximizing their utility or their true utility cannot be fully represented by
Equation (1). The standard way to think about the complete-markets model is as describing a world
in which there is also a government that imposes an unbearable utility cost to those individuals
that fail to pay their debts. In this situation, Equation (1) can be understood as representing utility
only conditional on paying debts. The (very low) level of utility that results from not paying debts
can be disregarded since it is never chosen in equilibrium.
20To see this, simply note that the individual component of production is absent in Equations (14) and (15).
21To see the former, simply note that the regional component of tradable production is absent in Equations (14) and
(15). To see the latter, use Jensen￿ s inequality to show that a mean-preserving spread in the nontradable component
of regional production lowers ex-ante utility.
12Although recognizing the role that governments play in sustaining asset markets is a small step
towards greater realism, it begs the question of why governments would always want to enforce
payments. To the extent that governments care more about domestic residents than about foreign
ones, they are subject to the same type of time-inconsistency problem that individuals are. Even
though governments would like to commit ex-ante to enforce payments by domestic residents, ex-
post they may have incentives to deviate and allow domestic residents to enjoy a higher level of
consumption. This time-inconsistency problem of governments is usually referred to as sovereign
risk, and the goal of this section is to analyze how it a⁄ects risk sharing and welfare.
2.1 The model with sovereign risk
We consider again the world economy described in section 1.1, but now we explicitly model gov-
ernments and their role as enforcers of private contracts. There are two governments, a Home
government which can enforce payments by residents of Home, and a Foreign government which
can enforce payments by residents of Foreign. Ex-post, an individual only pays if his/her gov-
ernment forces him/her to pay. Governments only care about the utility of the residents of their





i2Ij uis for all s 2 S, and the expected average utility of domestic residents during
youth, denoted V j ￿
R
i2Ij ￿s ￿ Ui for j 2 fH;Fg.22
If governments could credibly commit to enforce all payments during youth, they would always
choose to do so and all asset markets would be open. This is the extreme or polar case of perfect
commitment.23 If governments have some choice over enforcement after the state of nature is
revealed, they are tempted not to enforce payments to foreigners when these are high enough. We
ensure this temptation is always present by moving to the other extreme and assuming governments
cannot commit to enforce at all:
Assumption 1. LACK OF COMMITMENT: Governments simultaneously choose enforcement
during old age after the state of nature has been revealed and before markets open.
The e⁄ects of this lack of commitment depend crucially on the degree to which governments can
discriminate among creditors when enforcing payments. Assume, for instance, that governments
choose ex-post which particular payments to enforce so that they can fully discriminate between
22The fact that governments maximize average utility implies that, given our assumptions of symmetry, they have
an incentive to enforce domestic payments to improve the distribution of consumption. In addition to distributional
considerations, in reality governments probably have other reasons to enforce domestic payments. Brutti (2008) and
Gennaioli and Martin (2009) propose models in which domestic defaults reduce investment and output by destroying
liquidity held by the private sector.
23With perfect commitment, the equilibrium would be identical to the complete-markets model and would therefore
be fully described by Equations (6), (7), (8) and (12).
13creditors. This is the polar case of perfect discrimination without commitment. In the context of
our model, this would imply that governments would never enforce any payment from a domestic
resident to a foreign one. Asset markets would be geographically segmented and there would be no
trade in assets between residents of di⁄erent regions.24
If discrimination is less than perfect, lack of enforcement a⁄ects both domestic and international
transactions and this creates new and interesting interactions between domestic and international
asset trade. We take a ￿rst step towards analyzing these interactions by going to the other polar
case and assume that governments cannot discriminate among debtors. In particular, we assume:
Assumption 2. NON-DISCRIMINATORY ENFORCEMENT: Governments choose whether to
enforce all payments or none.
There are two aspects to this assumption. The ￿rst and crucial one is that governments cannot
discriminate by asset holder when deciding enforcement. All of our results depend on this. The
second aspect is that governments cannot discriminate by asset issuer when deciding enforcement.
This is necessary to keep the competitive nature of the equilibrium and we conjecture that it is
not crucial for the results that follow.25 Once again, we construct next the competitive equilibrium
recursively going backwards in time.
2.2 Goods markets and enforcement
During old age, the state of nature is revealed, then governments enforce payments, and then goods
markets open. De￿ne xj;is as the assets held by individual i that pay in state s issued by residents
of region j. Since governments now decide whether to enforce payments independently, it is not
su¢ cient to know the overall asset holdings of an individual, but also the residence of the issuer.
Unlike section 1.2, the budget constraints of old individuals must now re￿ ect the fact that assets
are worthless if there is no enforcement. That is, we must replace Equation (3) by the following
24With perfect discrimination without commitment, there would still be international trade in goods since such
trade is arms￿length and, thus, not a⁄ected by sovereign risk. In addition, domestic asset trade would still take
place since, in equilibrium, this trade would result in payments from residents with low marginal utility to residents
with high marginal utility. Enforcing these payments would raise the average utility of the region. Therefore, the
equilibrium with perfect discrimination and without commitment is fully described by Equations (6), (7) and (8)
with asset holdings xis = y
j(i)
s ￿ yis for all s 2 S and i 2 I
W.
25We could allow for discrimination by groups of issuers as long as all the groups have many individuals. Then,
individuals would still take enforcement as given and behave competitively. If discrimination is instead at the
individual level, then individuals would choose their privately optimal level of borrowing. The reason why this would
not signi￿cantly a⁄ect the results is that as long as individuals cannot control who holds the assets they issue, they
cannot reduce their borrowing from foreigners without reducing their borrowing from other domestic residents. We





s (z) ￿ cis(z) ￿ dz ￿ yis + eH
s ￿ xH;is + eF
s ￿ xF;is for all s 2 S and i 2 IW. (16)
where e
j
s is an indicator variable that takes value one if government j enforces and zero otherwise.
Governments simultaneously choose whether to enforce payments or not so as to maximize
the average utility of domestic residents. When considering their enforcement choice, governments
take the actions of the other government as given. That is, enforcement decisions are the Nash
















for all s 2 S and j 2 fH;Fg. (17)




s(not enforce), the government is indi⁄erent between enforcing or
not and both e
j
s = 1 and e
j
s = 0 are best responses. We de￿ne Ej ￿ S as the set of states in which
government j decides to enforce payments for j 2 fH;Fg.26
A competitive equilibrium during old age consists of a set of goods prices and quantities such
that individuals maximize their utility ￿ Equation (1)￿subject to their budget constraint ￿ Equation
(16)￿ , governments enforce so as to maximize average utility of their region ￿ Equation (17)￿and
goods markets clear ￿ Equations (4) and (5). Once again, the state variables of this problem are
individual productions fyis(￿)gi2IW and asset holdings fxj;isgj2fH;Fg;i2IW .
To compute this equilibrium, replace
xis = eH
s ￿ xH;is + eF
s ￿ xF;is for all s 2 S and i 2 IW (18)
in Equations (6), (7) and (8) to ￿nd the equilibrium consumption allocations as functions of en-
forcement decisions. Then, substitute these consumption allocations into the best responses of
governments to ￿nd the equilibrium enforcement decisions as a function of the state variables of
this problem, i.e. individual productions fyis(￿)gi2IW and asset holdings fxj;isgj2fH;Fg;i2IW . Once
again, asset holdings are determined during youth as we show next.
2.3 Asset markets
During youth, individuals trade in asset markets. The individual maximization problems are as
in section 1.3, except that now agents can only sell securities which pay in states in which their
26We are focusing on non-cooperative equilibria. Section 4.2 explores the e⁄ects of cooperation.





s ￿ xH;is + qF
s ￿ xF;is
￿
￿ 0 for all i 2 IW, (19)
xj(i);is ￿ ￿^ yis and x￿j(i);is ￿ 0 for all s 2 S and i 2 IW, (20)





yis if s 2 Ej(i)
0 if s = 2 Ej(i)
for all i 2 IW. (21)
Equation (19) is the budget constraint. Equations (20) and (21) de￿ne the borrowing constraint.
They say that individuals cannot pledge income in states in which their government does not enforce
payments and that consumption must be non-negative.27 They also say that individuals cannot
issue assets that are enforced by the government of the other region. Note that individuals do not
take into consideration how their choice of asset holdings a⁄ects the enforcement decision of their
government and, consequently, the borrowing constraints of other residents. This externality leads
individuals to borrow too much from abroad during youth.28;29
The market clearing conditions for asset markets are now given by
Z
i2IW
xj;is = 0 for all s 2 S and j 2 fH;Fg. (22)
Equation (22) simply states that there is a zero net supply of each country￿ s assets.
A competitive equilibrium during youth consists of a set of asset prices and quantities such
that individuals maximize expected utility ￿ Equation (2)￿subject to their budget and borrowing
constraints ￿ Equations (19), (20) and (21)￿and asset markets clear ￿ Equation (22). Naturally,
when maximizing their utility, individuals take as given how their individual consumption during
old age depends on their individual asset holdings.
27For example, a Home resident might want to sell assets that pay in a state, say s, in which his/her production is
high in order to purchase assets that pay in states in which his/her production is low. However, if in state s the Home
government does not enforce payments, s = 2 E
H, this resident will not pay his/her debts when state s materializes.
Knowing this ex-ante, other agents would not be willing to purchase any assets that pay in state s from this Home
resident. Therefore, Home production in state s is not pledgable. Similarly, no agent would be willing to purchase
assets from Foreign residents that pay in states in which the Foreign government does not enforce payments.
28We shall come back to this point in Section 4.1 to show that our results go through even if governments introduce
optimal borrowing limits.
29This overborrowing externality has played a central role in the literature on sovereign risk. For recent discussions
of the problem, see FernÆndez-Arias and Lombardo (2000), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001), Tirole (2003),
Kehoe and Perri (2004), Jeske (2006), Uribe (2006), and Wright (2006). This externality is not present in a related
literature that assumes that governments never enforce payments and asks instead whether the desire to keep an
individual-speci￿c reputation provides su¢ cient incentives for individuals to repay their debts. See Kehoe and Levine
(1993), Kocherlakota (1996), Alvarez and Jermann (2000).
16We restrict the analysis to symmetric equilibria.30 De￿ne a coarse partition of states of nature
based on sets of productions in Home and Foreign as opposed to individual productions. Abusing
notation, we refer to the set of states fs 2 S : fyis(￿)gi2IH = Y and fyis(￿)gi2IF = Y g as a single




. Given our assumption of symmetry
within regions, each such ￿state￿is composed of a large number of equiprobable states, one for
each way in which these regional sets of productions can be distributed among residents within
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This restriction is not without loss of generality, since the model also has asymmetric equilibria.
But it delivers a high payo⁄ in terms of tractability since it implies that residents in both regions
have the same budget constraint multipliers ￿ during youth and we can therefore analyze pairs of
symmetric states independently.
Typically, there are many symmetric equilibria. To see this, consider a pair of symmetric states.
If individuals expect enforcement in both regions, it is possible (but not necessary) that asset trade
be such that both regions enforce and validate individuals￿expectations. If individuals expect non-
enforcement in both regions, then there is no asset trade and these individuals￿expectations are a
consistent belief. Thus, expectations play an important role in this world. But we do not emphasize
this feature in what follows. Instead, we focus exclusively on the best symmetric equilibrium and
we refer to it as ￿the￿sovereign risk equilibrium. This equilibrium arises when individuals have
the most optimistic expectations about enforcement and the maximum number of asset markets
are open.
Appendix A provides a detailed description of how we construct this equilibrium. Basically, we
do this by checking, for each pair of symmetric states, if there exists an equilibrium in which both
governments enforce payments. If it exists, we choose it. Otherwise, we check whether there is an
equilibrium in which at least one region enforces. If it exists, we choose it. Otherwise, we conclude
that there is no enforcement. We ￿nd that the equilibrium constructed in this way sometimes
contains states in which there is enforcement in one region but not in the other and, as a result,
EH 6= EF. To streamline the exposition, in the main text we focus only on the case in which, in
all states, there is enforcement either in both regions or in neither and EH = EF ￿ E. This case
30Without loss of generality (see Appendix A), we also impose the restriction that there be no two-way international




i2IF xH;is is zero for all s 2 S.






s ￿ yis if s 2 E
0 if s = 2 E
for all i 2 IW (23)
That is, income is equally divided among all individuals in those states in which asset markets are
open. Naturally, there is no asset trade in those states in which asset markets are closed.
We have now a complete description of the sovereign risk equilibrium. For a given set of
individual productions fyis(￿)gi2IW and asset holdings fxj;isgj2fH;Fg;i2IW, Equations (6), (7), (8),
(17), and (18) describe the consumption allocation that come out of goods markets during old
age and Equation (17) determines the enforcement set. For a given set of individual productions
fyis(￿)gi2IW, Equation (23) describes the asset holdings that come out from asset markets during
youth. We describe the welfare properties of this equilibrium next.
2.4 Domestic and international risk sharing with sovereign risk
Sovereign risk destroys some asset markets, and this reduces domestic and international risk sharing.
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1 if s 2 E
￿is ￿ ￿
j(i)
s if s = 2 E
for all i 2 IW (26)
That is, ￿is and ￿
j
s measure the individual and regional components of incomes when there is no
enforcement. By construction, these components have a constant mean, i.e.
R
i2Ij ￿is = 1 and
0:5 ￿ (￿H
s + ￿F
s ) = 1 for all s = 2 E. In those states in which asset markets are open there are
no individual and regional components to incomes because asset trade ensures perfect sharing of
income risk. But this is not possible in those states in which asset markets are closed.31 Plugging
31Note that, in states without enforcement, individuals are constrained to consuming a bundle of goods whose value
is equal to the value of their production. They are not constrained to consuming their own productions because they

























￿s ￿ ln￿is for any i 2 IW.
Finally, it follows from Equation (17) that the enforcement set is given by:
E =
￿
s 2 S : ￿
Z
i2IR




where R is the rich region in the corresponding state, i.e. ￿R
s = maxf￿H
s ;￿F
s g. The right- and
left-hand sides of the enforcement condition are the cost and bene￿t of enforcement, respectively.
The cost of enforcement equals the number of goods that are shared between regions, ￿, times the
average (across goods) reduction in ex-post welfare that the rich region su⁄ers when it shares them
with the poor region, ln￿R




Equations (24), (25), (27) and (28) provide a full description of consumption and welfare. As
long as there is no enforcement in some states, i.e. E 6= S, there is imperfect domestic sharing of
all goods and imperfect international sharing of tradable goods. This is because individuals are
forced to choose consumption baskets worth no more than their production bundle in those states
in which the corresponding asset market is closed. The sovereign-risk consumption allocations are
therefore ￿ ex-ante￿Pareto ine¢ cient. This is shown in Equation (27) which di⁄ers from (15) by the
third and fourth integrals. Jensen￿ s inequality implies that these two integrals are negative. The
third integral re￿ ects the welfare loss from not being able to perfectly share tradable goods between
regions, while the fourth integral re￿ ects the welfare loss from not being able to perfectly share all
goods within regions.
The complete-markets equilibrium can now be re-interpreted as the special case of the sovereign-
risk equilibrium in which the enforcement set contains all states of nature, i.e. E = S, and markets
are complete. In general, however, the enforcement set is smaller than the set of all states, i.e.
E ￿ S, and markets are incomplete. The number of asset markets that are closed and therefore
the ine¢ ciency created by sovereign risk depends on individual and regional income risk. A mean
preserving spread in ￿is in the rich region increases the loss in average utility that results from a
breakdown in domestic payments, increasing government incentives to enforce and therefore the
size of the enforcement set. A mean preserving spread in ￿
j
s raises the gains in average utility that
can still trade in goods markets.
19result from not paying debts to foreigners, reducing incentives to enforce and therefore the size of
the enforcement set.32;33
The sovereign-risk equilibrium shares some features with the complete-markets equilibrium. For
instance, in both equilibria welfare increases with world production of any good but decreases with
a mean-preserving spread in the world production of any good. Also, in both equilibria welfare
decreases with an increase in regional risk on nontradable goods. Moreover, the intuitions behind
these results are exactly the same in both equilibria since neither world production nor the regional
component of the production of nontradables a⁄ect the size of the enforcement set.
But the sovereign risk equilibrium di⁄ers from the complete-markets equilibrium in that welfare
depends on both individual risk and regional risk on tradable goods. This dependence can be quite
complex but can always be analyzed as the sum of two di⁄erent e⁄ects. For a given enforcement set,
higher volatility in individual and regional tradable production cannot be diversi￿ed away in those
states in which asset markets are closed and must lead one-to-one to higher volatility in individual
consumption in those states. This ￿rst e⁄ect of increases in individual and regional risk always
lowers welfare. But higher volatility in individual and tradable production also a⁄ect the size of
the enforcement set. An increase in individual risk tends to increase the enforcement set and this
increases welfare. Therefore, the ￿rst and second e⁄ects tend to work against each other in the
case of individual risk. An increase in regional risk for tradables tends to reduce the enforcement
set and this lowers welfare. Therefore, the ￿rst and second e⁄ects tend to reinforce each other in
the case of regional risk on tradable goods.
The sovereign-risk equilibrium provides a rich description of international trade in assets. Lack
of commitment or trust destroys asset markets and constitutes an impediment to trade. Individuals
cannot sell enough assets to ￿nance the purchase of other assets that would protect them from the
risks they face. Therefore, this is less than an ideal world given technological constraints to trade.
There exist two important interactions between domestic and international risk sharing. On the
one hand, the more domestic risk sharing is needed, the more asset markets are open and the more
international risk sharing is possible. After all, it is the fear to destroy domestic risk sharing that
induces governments to enforce international payments and thus sustains asset markets. On the
other hand, the more international risk sharing is needed, the more asset markets are closed and
32One must be careful when studying the e⁄ects of individual and regional risk for a given good. It is possible
that a mean-preserving spread in ￿is(z) bene￿ts disproportionally poor individuals and reduces the enforcement set.
Similarly, it is also possible that a mean-preserving spread in ￿
j
s(z) bene￿ts disproportionally the poor region and
increases the enforcement set.
33Note that the default penalties, usually arising from losses of reputation, emphasized by previous literature in
sovereign risk are absent and therefore play no role in the decision to enforce. In Appendix B we extend the model
to account for penalties and show that our results are robust to this extension.
20the less domestic risk sharing is possible. After all, it is the temptation to default on foreigners that
induces governments not to enforce payments and thus destroys asset markets. These interactions
play a crucial role in determining the e⁄ects of globalization, as we describe in the next section.34
3 The e⁄ects of globalization
Globalization is a dynamic process. Thus, in this section we re-interpret the model as describing
the life of a typical generation in a world with overlapping generations. The number of generations,
which may be in￿nite, equals T. Generation t members are born at time t, with a project that
pays at t + 1. They maximize expected utility from consumption at t + 1. At time t they trade in
assets to diversify their production risk. Generation t members cannot trade assets with members
of di⁄erent generations: at time t + 1, they are old and the best they can do is to consume all of
their income; at time t, the only other living generation is generation t￿1, but since this generation
is old they cannot trade. As a result, individuals diversify their production risk as much as they
can by trading assets with other members of the same generation.35
The process of globalization consists of an increase in ￿ over time. In particular, we assume
￿0 = 0, ￿t+1 ￿ ￿t, and limt!T ￿t = 1. We de￿ne the gains from globalization as G(￿) ￿ U(￿)￿U(0),
where we have made explicit that the utility of any given generation depends on the fraction of
goods that are tradable. A generation born in autarky would be indi⁄erent between experiencing
growth in world production and consumption (of all goods in all states) by a factor expfG(￿)g and




























￿s ￿ ln￿is for any i 2 IW.
Equation (29), together with Equation (28), provides a full description of the gains from globaliza-
tion. In autarky, sovereign risk is not a problem and all asset markets are open. There is perfect
domestic sharing of all goods, but technological constraints to trade prevent international sharing.
As a result i￿ s consumption of good z ￿ uctuates across states following regional production. Glob-
34These interactions were not present in the case without sovereign risk described in Section 1. They would not be
present either if enforcement were fully discriminatory.
35In this section, we focus on equilibria of this many-period model in which the present actions of governments
and/or individuals are independent of past actions. This rules out bubbly and reputational types of equilibria. In
this case, the consumption and welfare of each generation is identical to that of the two-period model of Section 2,
and is fully described by Equations (24), (25), (27) and (28). In Appendix B we analyze reputational equilibria.
21alization removes technological constraints to trade but also creates sovereign risk that leads to the
closing of asset markets. In those states in which asset markets are open, i.e. s 2 E, globalization
allows perfect international sharing of tradable goods without a⁄ecting domestic sharing. This gain
is captured by the ￿rst term in Equation (29). In those states in which asset markets are closed,
i.e. s = 2 E, globalization allows imperfect international sharing of tradable goods, but it reduces
domestic sharing of all goods. The second and third terms in Equation (29) capture this gain and
loss from globalization. In this section, we study how all of these forces combine to determine the
e⁄ects of globalization on risk sharing and welfare.36
3.1 Globalization, enforcement and welfare without terms-of-trade e⁄ects
We start our analysis with the case in which both regions have the same relative supplies of goods
so that there are no terms-of-trade e⁄ects. This case provides a natural benchmark since, as in
most of modern macroeconomics, the world economy behaves as if there were a single aggregate or
composite good. The results that come out of this case are the main insights or predictions of the
theory.
Since individual or regional production bundles, i.e. fyis(￿)gi2IW , are exogenous to the analysis,
globalization can only a⁄ect the relative values of these bundles, i.e. ￿is and ￿
j
s, through changes
in goods prices. When this is the case, we say that globalization has terms-of-trade e⁄ects. We
ensure next that globalization has no terms-of-trade e⁄ects by assuming that regional production
bundles have the same proportions of all goods:
￿j
s(z) = ￿j
s(0) for all z2[0;1], s 2 S, and j 2 fH;Fg. (30)
This condition implies that @￿is=@￿ = 0 and @￿
j
s=@￿ = 0. That is, globalization a⁄ects neither
the within- nor the between-region inequality that would occur in the absence of enforcement.37 In
this case, the gains from globalization are







￿s ￿ ln￿is for any i 2 IW. (31)
36In the polar case of perfect commitment, all asset markets would be open and all the gains from globalization would








￿dz ￿ 0 for
any i 2 I
W. In the polar case of perfect discrimination without commitment, asset markets would be geographically
segmented and the gains from globalization would come from being able to imperfectly share a larger fraction of










￿ dz ￿ 0 for any i 2 I
W. Both of these polar cases therefore
yield a smooth and conventional picture of globalization gradually increasing welfare because globalization does not
a⁄ect the degree of market incompleteness.
37In this world of symmetric regions and individuals, asset trade ensures that all incomes are equalized when there
is enforcement.
22For a given enforcement set, welfare is non-decreasing in ￿. In those states in which asset markets
are open, i.e. s 2 E, globalization permits international sharing in a growing fraction of goods. In
those states in which asset markets are closed, i.e. s = 2 E, globalization does not a⁄ect domestic or
international sharing of goods. This is all standard and well known.
But the enforcement set is itself a non-increasing function of ￿. To see this, consider a pair of
symmetric states fs;s0g. The top panel of Figure 1 shows the bene￿t and cost of enforcement in
these states (see Equation (28)). While the bene￿t of enforcement does not depend on ￿, the cost of
enforcement is proportional to ￿. If individual risk is not too high, i.e. ￿
R
i2IR ln￿is < ln￿R
s , there
exists a threshold ￿￿
s(= ￿￿
s0) such that, if ￿ ￿ ￿￿
s both asset markets exists, but if ￿ > ￿￿
s both asset










This threshold is increasing in individual risk, but decreasing in regional risk. This is a direct
implication of the already familiar trade-o⁄ behind enforcement decisions. If ￿￿
s > 1, globalization
never closes the market for assets that pay in state s. If ￿￿
s < 1, globalization closes this market
on the ￿rst date in which ￿t > ￿￿
s and it never reopens again. This e⁄ect of globalization on
enforcement is new and uncovering it is one of the main contributions of this paper.
Our symmetry assumptions allow us to study the contribution to overall welfare of each pair
of symmetric states separately. The bottom panel shows how the contribution of a pair of states
s and s0 changes as globalization proceeds. Assume ￿￿
s < 1 and let t￿




s+1. All generations born at date t ￿ t￿
s open the asset markets for this pair of states.
Therefore globalization allows international sharing on a growing number of goods and increases
the contribution of this pair of states to welfare. But this also requires growing payments between
regions in these states. When generation t￿
s arrives, these payments would have grown too large and
the temptation to default would have been irresistible. Since individuals anticipate this, the asset
markets for this pair of states close. This eliminates all international sharing of tradable goods and
worsens domestic sharing of goods. As a result, the contribution to welfare of this pair of states
drops discretely to a level that is below that of autarky. All the generations born at dates t > t￿
s
share this low level of welfare in this pair of states.
It is now straightforward to use the theory to provide an account of the e⁄ects of global-
















if and only if ￿t ￿ ￿￿
p. Without loss
of generality, we order pairs of symmetric states according to ￿￿
p; i.e. ￿￿
1 ￿ ￿￿
2 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
P.
The e⁄ects of globalization on welfare are illustrated in the three panels of Figure 2.38 Assume






p < 1 and, for these pairs, let t￿




p+1. All generations born in date t ￿ t￿
1 bene￿t from globalization because all asset
markets are open and globalization enlarges the set of goods that are shared internationally. At
t = t￿
1, the asset markets corresponding to the pair of symmetric states (s1;s0
1) close leading to a
reduction in both domestic and international sharing in these states. This leads to a discrete loss of
welfare that persists forever since these asset markets never re-open. All generations born in dates
t￿
1 < t < t￿
2 bene￿t from further globalization as, once again, it enlarges the set of goods that can be
shared internationally. Note however that this e⁄ect is smaller than in earlier generations because
the newly tradable goods cannot be shared in the pair of states (s1;s0
1). At t = t￿
2, the asset markets
corresponding to the pair of symmetric states (s2;s0
2) close and this leads to another discrete and
persistent loss of welfare. After this, subsequent generations bene￿t from further globalization until
the following pair of asset markets close. This process continues until the world is fully globalized.
The theory therefore predicts that globalization worsens enforcement. It also highlights the
interplay of two opposing forces that shape the net e⁄ect of globalization on welfare. On the one
hand, globalization removes technological constraints to trade and improves international sharing
of goods. These are the classic gains from trade and their size grows with regional endowment
di⁄erences. On the other hand, globalization creates sovereign risk and worsens domestic and
international sharing of goods. These costs of trade are new to this paper and their size grows
with regional endowment di⁄erences and declines declines with individual endowment di⁄erences.
The top panel of Figure 2 shows the case in which the balance of these e⁄ects is always positive
and welfare increases monotonically with globalization. The middle panel shows the opposite case
in which the balance of these e⁄ects is negative and welfare falls monotonically with globalization.
Finally, the lower panel shows a case in which the balance of these e⁄ects changes sign many times
and the e⁄ects of globalization on welfare are not monotonic.
The benchmark case in which globalization does not generate terms-of-trade e⁄ects provides a
sharp picture of the e⁄ects globalization.39 When we go beyond this benchmark case and generalize
the theory, we ￿nd that the basic picture remains robust, although it requires some interesting
quali￿cations. We show this next.
38The jagged line shows the case of a ￿nite number of states (as explained in the text) while the smooth line shows
the limiting case in which the number of states approaches in￿nity.
39Note that we have assumed much less than in standard macroeconomics models since we allow for individual
di⁄erences in relative productions. We have only assumed that there are no di⁄erences in regional relative productions
so that there is no scope for international trade in goods.
243.2 Globalization, enforcement and welfare (II): terms-of-trade e⁄ects
If condition (30) does not hold, globalization creates changes in the terms of trade that a⁄ect the
relative values of individual and regional production bundles, i.e. ￿is and ￿
j
s. That is, we have now
that globalization can a⁄ect within- and between-region inequality in the absence of enforcement,
i.e. @￿is=@￿ 6= 0 and @￿
j
s=@￿ 6= 0.
For a given enforcement set, welfare no longer needs to be non-decreasing in ￿, as shown by
Equation (29). Increases in ￿ still permit international sharing of a larger fraction of goods in all
states and this raises welfare. But now, in addition, globalization a⁄ects domestic sharing of goods
in those states in which the corresponding asset market is closed, i.e. s = 2 E. For instance, a change
in the terms of trade that increases individual risk worsens domestic sharing of goods and lowers
welfare.
Terms-of-trade e⁄ects also have implications for the shape of the enforcement set, as shown
by Equation (28). Without terms-of-trade e⁄ects, enforcement only takes place at low values of
￿. This is because in this case the cost of enforcement grows proportionally with globalization,
while the bene￿t of enforcement is not a⁄ected by globalization. But this need not be the case if
globalization creates terms-of-trade e⁄ects. For instance, it is possible that terms-of-trade e⁄ects
reduce regional risk so fast that the cost of enforcement falls with globalization. It is also possible
that terms-of-trade e⁄ects increase individual risk so that the bene￿t from enforcement grows with
globalization.
3.2.1 Regional terms-of-trade e⁄ects
It is useful to proceed step-by-step and consider ￿rst the case in which globalization creates terms-
of-trade e⁄ects that alter between-region inequality in the absence of insurance, but do not alter
the within-region inequality. This happens when the production bundles of all individuals within
a region have the same proportions of all goods:
￿is(z) = ￿is(0) for all z2[0;1], s 2 S, and i 2 IW. (33)
When this condition applies, we have that @￿is=@￿ = 0.
For a given enforcement set, welfare is non-decreasing in ￿ like in the previous section. In
those states in which asset markets are open, i.e. s 2 E, globalization allows perfect international
sharing of a larger fraction of goods. In those states in which asset markets are closed, i.e. s = 2 E,
globalization does not a⁄ect domestic sharing but allows imperfect international sharing of a larger
fraction of goods.
25But the e⁄ects of globalization on enforcement are richer than in the previous section. Since
condition (33) ensures that @￿is=@￿ = 0, we still have that the bene￿t of enforcement is independent
of ￿. But now the cost of enforcement need not be proportional to ￿. If globalization increases
(decreases) regional risk, i.e. @￿R
s =@￿ > 0 (@￿R
s =@￿ < 0), the cost of enforcement will increase
more (less) than proportionally with ￿. And whether globalization increases or reduces regional
risk depends on whether the marginal tradable good is more or less procyclical than the average
tradable one, i.e. on whether ￿R
s (￿) > ￿R
s or ￿R
s (￿) < ￿R
s .40






￿(0) for z 2[0;0:5]
￿(1) for z 2(0:5;1]
with ￿(0) > 1. In this example, the cost of enforcement grows proportionally with ￿ until ￿ = 0:5
since, in this range, the marginal tradable goods have the same cyclical properties as the average
one. After ￿ = 0:5, this is no longer the case. Does this make a di⁄erence? If the marginal tradable
goods are either procyclical or mildly countercyclical,41 then the picture of globalization remains
essentially the same as in the previous section. If ￿(1) > ￿(0), the cost of enforcement grows more
than proportionally with ￿. If ￿(1) < ￿(0), the cost of enforcement grows less than proportionally
with ￿. In any case, globalization raises the cost of enforcement and might eventually lead to the
closure of the corresponding asset markets.
It is possible however that the marginal tradable goods be so countercyclical that the cost of
enforcement declines over some range. This case is shown in Figure 3, where we have assumed that
￿(1) = 2 ￿ ￿(0). After ￿ = 0:5, the cost of enforcement starts declining and reaches zero when
￿ = 1. The bene￿t of enforcement is independent of ￿ since condition (33) applies. If individual
risk is not too high, i.e. ￿
R
i2IR ln￿is < 0:5￿ln￿(0); enforcement takes place at low and high levels




The contribution of this pair of states to welfare at di⁄erent stages of globalization is shown in
the bottom panel of Figure 3. Let t￿
s and t￿￿







s +1, respectively. Let also t0:5
s be the generation such that ￿t0:5
s ￿ 0:5 < ￿t0:5
s +1. All
generations born at date t ￿ t￿
s open the asset markets for this pair of states. Therefore globalization
allows international sharing on a growing number of goods and increases the contribution of this
pair of states to welfare. But this also requires growing payments between regions in these states.
40To see this note that @￿
R
s =@￿ = ￿
￿1 ￿ (￿
R
s (￿) ￿ ￿
R
s ).
41More precisely, assume that ￿(1) > ￿ ￿, where ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(0) ￿ (1 ￿ ln￿(0)) < 1 (this inequality follows from ￿(0) > 1).
26When generation t￿
s arrives, these payments would have grown too large and the temptation to
default would have been irresistible. Since individuals anticipate this, the asset markets for this
pair of states close. This eliminates all international sharing of tradable goods and reduces domestic
sharing of all goods. The contribution of this pair of states to welfare drops discretely to a level






share this very low level
of welfare. Generations born in t 2 [t0:5
s ;t￿￿
s ) bene￿t from globalization. Although asset markets
remain closed, goods markets now allow imperfect international sharing of tradable goods. Note
also that changes in the terms-of-trade raise the relative income of the poor region and reduce
the payments that would be required to achieve perfect international sharing of tradable goods.
When generation t￿￿
s arrives, these payments are low enough and enforcement is possible again.
Asset markets re-open and both domestic and international sharing is reestablished. This leads to
a discrete increase in welfare. For t ￿ t￿￿
s , asset markets are always open and globalization enlarges
the fraction of goods that can be shared internationally.42
To sum up, this section shows how the e⁄ects of globalization on enforcement depend on the
cyclicality of the marginal tradable goods relative to the average tradable one. If the marginal goods
are more (less) procyclical than the average one, the cost of enforcement grows faster (slower) than
in the benchmark case. It is possible that the marginal tradable goods be so countercyclical that
the cost of enforcement falls with globalization in some range. In this case, it is also possible that
globalization improves enforcement.
3.2.2 Individual terms-of-trade e⁄ects
Finally, if we relax Condition (33) globalization creates terms-of-trade e⁄ects that alter both
between- and within-region inequality in the absence of enforcement. The e⁄ects of globaliza-
tion on the cost of enforcement are as described in the previous section. What is new here is that
globalization also a⁄ects the bene￿t of enforcement.
Should we expect globalization to increase or decrease within-region inequality in the absence
of enforcement? The answer, once again, depends on whether the marginal tradable goods are
more or less procyclical than the average one.43 But it also depends now on the importance of
the marginal tradable goods in the bundles of rich and poor individuals. To see this, consider
￿rst how globalization a⁄ects the price of these goods in the absence of enforcement. If they are
less procyclical than the average one (i.e. they are relatively scarce in the rich region), their price
42Note that asset markets are not used when globalization has been completed since the value of production in
each region is the same in all states. The model of Cole and Obstfeld (1991) can be re-interpreted as the particular
case of this example in which ￿
R(0) = 2 and ￿ = 1.
43Remember that when ￿
R
s (￿) = ￿
R
s , then @￿is=@￿ = 0 for all i.
27declines relative to other goods. In turn, if these goods are abundant in the production bundles of
poor (rich) individuals, within-region inequality increases (falls). A similar reasoning applies to the
case in which the marginal tradable goods are more procyclical than the average one. Therefore,
for globalization to increase the bene￿ts of enforcement two conditions are necessary. The ￿rst one
is that globalization change goods prices. This requires that the cyclical properties of the marginal
tradable goods be di⁄erent from those of the average one. The second condition is that this change
in goods prices negatively a⁄ect poor individuals. This requires that their production bundles be
relatively abundant in those goods whose price falls with globalization.
We conclude this section by showing an example in which terms-of-trade e⁄ects take us as far
away from the benchmark as possible. Consider a simple modi￿cation of the previous example in
which, instead of all individuals within a region producing the same bundle of goods, half of the





2 for z 2[0;0:5] and 0 for z 2(0:5;1] with prob. 0.5
0 for z 2[0;0:5] and 2 for z 2(0:5;1] with prob. 0.5
for all i 2 Ij and j 2 fH;Fg:
Note that, in this example, full domestic sharing of all goods is achieved in autarky without asset
trade, since the value of the production bundle of all the residents of a region is the same. That is,
the value of asset markets in autarky is zero.
The top panel of Figure 4 shows the bene￿t and cost of enforcement both as functions of ￿.
The cost of enforcement is as in the previous case, since it only depends on regional risk. But the
bene￿t of enforcement now depends on ￿ since changes in ￿ a⁄ect individual risk. This bene￿t
starts at zero when ￿ = 0 since asset markets are not used in autarky. Globalization does not
create any international goods trade when ￿ ￿ 0:5 and, as a result, the relative prices of high-
and low-index goods are not a⁄ected in this range. Without terms-of-trade e⁄ects, the bene￿t of
enforcement continues being zero throughout this range. When ￿ > 0:5, regions start to trade
goods and terms-of-trade e⁄ects start to kick in. In particular, international trade in goods raises
the prices of low-index goods relative to high-index ones. This reduces domestic risk sharing and
increases the bene￿t of enforcement (this also reduces the cost of enforcement, as explained in
the previous subsection). As ￿ increases, terms-of-trade e⁄ects grow stronger and the bene￿t of
enforcement increases. There is therefore a threshold level ￿￿
s such that there is enforcement only
for ￿ ￿ ￿￿
s.
The bottom panel shows how the contribution to welfare of this pair of states changes with
globalization. Generations born in t ￿ t0:5
s are not a⁄ected by globalization. There is no enforcement
28but goods prices are such that there is perfect domestic sharing of all goods. As discussed above,
there is no international sharing of tradable goods. Globalization has two opposing e⁄ects on the
welfare of generations born in t 2 [t0:5
s ;t￿
s). On the one hand, globalization improves sharing of
tradable goods between regions. On the other hand, globalization worsens domestic sharing of
nontradable goods. In this range, the negative e⁄ect of globalization on domestic sharing raises
the bene￿t of enforcement. Also, the cost of enforcement declines as the same terms-of-trade
e⁄ects that increase individual risk also reduce regional risk. When generation t￿
s arrives, the
bene￿t of enforcement has increased enough and the cost of enforcement has decreased enough
that enforcement becomes possible again and asset markets open. At this point there is a discrete
increase in welfare. All generations born after t￿
s open asset markets and bene￿t from globalization
as it enlarges the fraction of goods that can be shared internationally.
To sum up, the e⁄ects of globalization on enforcement depend on how the gains and losses of
globalization are distributed. In particular, if the gains fall disproportionally on the rich, inequality
and, thus, the bene￿ts of enforcement increase. If this e⁄ect is strong enough, globalization improves
enforcement.
4 The role of policy
The cornerstone of the theory developed above is the trade-o⁄ that governments face when decid-
ing their enforcement policy. On the one hand, enforcement increases payments from domestic to
foreign residents that lower domestic consumption and welfare. On the other hand, enforcement
increases payments between domestic residents that improve domestic sharing of goods and there-
fore raise welfare. This trade-o⁄ determines the states of nature in which governments choose to
enforce payments and, therefore, the set of assets that can be traded.
In our setup, the closure of markets constitutes a failure and this is the direct result of two
externalities. The ￿rst one is that individuals do not take into consideration how their choice of asset
holdings a⁄ects the enforcement decision of their government. This externality leads individuals
to borrow so much from abroad that governments prefer not to enforce. One might think that
imposing borrowing limits would solve this problem and avoid the closure of markets. Section 4.1
shows that this is only partially true and that, in any case, allowing the government to set optimal
borrowing limits has surprisingly little e⁄ect on the picture of globalization developed in the last
two sections.
The second externality is that governments do not take into consideration how their enforcement
decisions a⁄ect foreigners. This externality leads governments not to enforce payments even though
29the domestic bene￿ts from not enforcing are always below the foreign costs. It might seem therefore
that the closure of markets could be avoided if governments could pay each other ex-post to enforce.
Section 4.2 shows that this is not the case however.
If governments cannot fully o⁄set these externalities, it might still be possible to improve welfare
by using trade policy to ￿ght globalization back. After all, countries are not forced to accept
globalization ￿as it comes.￿ Unfortunately, we show in section 4.3 that when governments lack
commitment ￿ghting globalization back is not as easy to do as it might seem at ￿rst sight.
4.1 Borrowing limits
In our model, market incompleteness results in individuals not being able to issue assets that pay in
states in which there is no enforcement. This follows, in part, from an overborrowing externality. In
particular, individuals do not take into consideration how their choice of asset holdings a⁄ects the
enforcement decision of their government and, consequently, the borrowing limits of other residents.
This leads individuals to borrow so much from abroad during youth that governments prefer not
to enforce in old age.
In principle, the solution to this problem consists of imposing limits to foreign borrowing. But
this solution is not available if government policy cannot discriminate between asset holders, as we
have assumed throughout the paper. The same reasons (opaque ￿nancial intermediaries and deep
secondary markets) that impede governments to discriminate between asset holders when enforcing
payments also impede them to discriminate between asset holders when imposing borrowing limits.
We therefore assume that governments can only impose limits on overall borrowing.44
Assume governments limit private borrowing using asset-speci￿c issuance rights. Governments
choose the number of issuance rights for each asset, denoted ￿ x
j
s for s 2 S and j 2 fH;Fg, which
they distribute equally among their domestic residents. During youth agents trade in both issuance
rights and assets, under the constraint that their issuance is limited by the issuance rights they
44With discriminatory borrowing limits, governments could achieve a constrained e¢ cient equilibrium in which
there is perfect domestic risk sharing and constrained international risk sharing. In particular, for each state the rich
region would impose no limits on domestic borrowing and the loosest limit ￿ x
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holds. In this constrained optimum, globalization would never have negative e⁄ects on domestic risk sharing, although
it may (locally) tighten the borrowing constraint and worsen international risk sharing. It would still be true that
the higher the importance of domestic risk sharing the more international risk sharing there can be.





s ￿ xH;is + qF
s ￿ xF;is + ￿j(i)
s ￿
￿
￿ xis ￿ ￿ xj(i)
s
￿￿
￿ 0 for all i 2 IW, (34)
xj(i);is ￿ ￿minf^ yis; ￿ xisg and x￿j(i);is ￿ 0 for all s 2 S and i 2 IW, (35)
where ￿ xis denotes the state-s issuance rights held by individual i after the market for issuance rights
closes, ￿
j
s denotes the price of state-s issuance rights in country j, and we used the fact that before
the market for issuance rights opens individual i holds ￿ x
j(i)
s state-s issuance rights. In addition
to the market clearing conditions for assets in Equation (22) we now also have market clearing
conditions for issuance rights, which are given by
Z
i2Ij
￿ xis = ￿ xj
s for all s 2 S and j 2 fH;Fg. (36)
A competitive equilibrium with borrowing limits during youth consists of a set of asset prices and
quantities such that individuals maximize expected utility ￿ Equation (2)￿subject to their budget
and borrowing constraints ￿ Equations (34), (35) and (21)￿and asset markets clear ￿ Equations (22)
and Equation (36). Naturally, when maximizing their utility, individuals take as given how their
individual consumption during old age depends on their individual asset holdings.
In Appendix C we analyze the equilibrium with optimal borrowing limits and show that it
contains three types of states. In those states in which there is enforcement even in the absence of
borrowing limits, it is optimal not to impose binding limits and the price of issuance rights is zero
in both regions. In the remaining states, it is possible (but not necessary) that borrowing limits
in the rich region allow enforcement and trade. In those states in which this happens, we have
that the price of issuance rights is positive in the rich region and asset markets are open. Paying
issuance rights introduces a wedge between the ex-post incomes of borrowers and lenders and, even
though asset markets are open, both domestic and international sharing of goods is imperfect. In
those states in which there is no borrowing limit that would lead to enforcement and trade, the
price of issuance rights is zero in both regions and asset markets remain closed.
The e⁄ects of globalization with optimal borrowing limits are illustrated in Figure 5. The left
two panels refer to the case of no terms-of-trade e⁄ects illustrated in Figure 1. The top panel
shows the optimal issuance rights price in the rich region as a function of ￿ (this price is always
zero in the poor region), which we denote ￿￿
s(￿). For ￿ ￿ ￿￿
s, borrowing limits are not needed for
enforcement to take place so ￿￿
s(￿) = 0. In addition, for ￿ su¢ ciently higher than ￿￿
s borrowing
limits are not useful either since the issuance rights price would need to be so high for enforcement
31to take place that no resident of the rich region would sell assets anyway. The optimal issuance
rights prices are positive only for values of ￿ that are a bit above ￿￿
s. The e⁄ects of globalization
on welfare for this pair of symmetric states is shown in the bottom panel. These e⁄ects are quite
similar to those in the absence of borrowing limits. The di⁄erence is that when generation t￿
s + 1
arrives, instead of asset trade disappearing the rich region imposes borrowing limits that lead to
a positive issuance rights price ￿￿
s(￿t￿
s+1). Although asset markets remain open, there is imperfect
domestic and international sharing of goods. Each new generation requires higher issuance rights
prices to keep enforcement. Conditional on issuance rights prices and enforcement, globalization
improves international sharing of newly tradable goods. However, domestic sharing of goods and
international sharing of inframarginal tradable goods worsen as a result of higher issuance rights
prices. The net e⁄ects of globalization on welfare are ambiguous. At some point, enforcement is
impossible even with borrowing limits, so the price of issuance rights fall to zero and globalization
eliminates all domestic and international sharing of goods. Borrowing limits delay the date in which
enforcement breaks down.
The middle two panels refer to the case illustrated in Figure 3 in which there are only regional
terms-of-trade e⁄ects. The top panel shows that the optimal issuance rights price is positive only
for values of ￿ that are a bit above ￿￿
s, and also for values of ￿ that are a bit below ￿￿￿
s . The bottom
panel shows that the e⁄ects of globalization on welfare for this pair of symmetric states are not
qualitatively a⁄ected by borrowing limits. Borrowing limits delay the time at which enforcement
breaks down and bring forward the time at which enforcement reappears. The right two panels refer
to the case illustrated in Figure 4 in which there are regional and individual terms-of-trade e⁄ects.
The top panel shows that the optimal issuance rights price is positive only for values of ￿ that are
a bit below ￿￿
s. Once again, the bottom panel shows that the e⁄ects of globalization on welfare for
this pair of symmetric states are not qualitatively a⁄ected by borrowing limits. Borrowing limits
simply bring forward the time at which enforcement appears.
This discussion shows that borrowing limits, though welfare-improving, have little e⁄ect on the
picture of globalization we presented in Section 3.45
45In Appendix D, we allow governments to shut down private asset markets and directly control the amount of
borrowing by issuing public debt. We show that such public intervention would also have little e⁄ect on the picture
of globalization presented here. The reason is that governments can control how much they borrow but cannot
control who they borrow from. In fact, the outcome with optimal public borrowing is inferior to the one with optimal
borrowing limits.
324.2 Renegotiation
We have assumed so far that governments decide enforcement policies non-cooperatively and do
not take into account how their decisions a⁄ect foreigners. This policy externality leads markets
to close whenever the costs of making foreign payments are greater than the bene￿t of keeping
domestic payments. At ￿rst sight, this might seem an easy problem to solve. After all, the gains
that the rich region obtains from not enforcing are always smaller than the losses that the poor
region su⁄ers. Allowing regions to renegotiate their debts ex-post should therefore ensure that
there is always enforcement. Unfortunately, this argument is wrong and we explain next why.
Consider a pair of symmetric states for which we concluded there is no enforcement in the best
symmetric equilibrium. We reached this conclusion by contradiction. Assume individuals expect
enforcement, then asset trade would be as in the complete-markets model and the government
of the rich region would have an incentive not to enforce. Therefore, individuals cannot expect
enforcement. This leads us to the conclusion that the only possible outcome is that individuals
do not expect enforcement. In this case, there is no asset trade and expecting governments not to
enforce is a consistent ￿o⁄-equilibrium￿belief.
This argument does not formally consider the possibility that regions cooperate during old age
and the question now is whether this omission matters or not. To be concrete, assume the poor
region can make a transfer to the rich region in exchange of enforcement. To raise revenue for this
transfer, the poor region levies lump-sum taxes on its residents. Ex-post, the poor region would be
willing to o⁄er a transfer to the rich region that is as large as the payments that its residents are due.
But the transfer need not be as large for it to work. Since not enforcing destroys valuable domestic
payments, the value of not enforcing for the rich region is smaller than the foreign payments it
saves by not enforcing. This observation could lead us to conclude that enforcement should be the
only outcome of any e¢ cient (and also some ine¢ cient) ex-post bargaining between regions.
But this conclusion would be unwarranted, since it assumes that free or unobstructed asset trade
during youth can lead to imperfect sharing ex-post. To see this, consider again a pair of states for
which we decided there is no enforcement in the best symmetric equilibrium. Assume now that
individuals were to expect that there is enforcement in old age and that this enforcement requires
a transfer. But then asset trade would not be as in the complete-markets model. Anticipating the
transfer, domestic residents would now feel richer and sell more assets to foreign residents which
now feel poorer. In particular, asset trade would be such that fully o⁄sets the transfer and achieves
perfect domestic sharing of all goods and perfect international sharing of tradable goods after the
transfer has been paid. But we know already that in this case the rich region has an incentive not
33to enforce and therefore individuals cannot expect that the transfer be enough to induce the rich
region to enforce.
This argument shows that the expectation of a debt renegotiation cannot sustain the opening
of asset markets, and leads us to conclude that allowing ex-post cooperation between regions does
not a⁄ect the equilibrium of the model.
4.3 Trade policy
Throughout the paper, we have analyzed the e⁄ects of globalization, understood as an increase in
the fraction of goods that can be traded across regions. Given the potentially negative e⁄ects of
globalization, it seems natural to explore the role of trade policy. In this section, we do this by
considering the e⁄ects of a very simple form of trade policy. We assume that governments have
the option of keeping all potentially tradable goods (i.e. z 2 [0;￿]) tradable, or making all goods
nontradable.46 We also assume that governments have as much commitment in setting trade policy
as they do in setting enforcement policy. Perhaps surprisingly, we show next that trade policy has
no e⁄ects whatsoever on the workings of asset markets and welfare.47
The equilibria of the model with trade policy are characterized by asset trade during youth, and
enforcement, trade policy, and goods trade during old age. As in the model without trade policy, we
only consider symmetric equilibria and can thus analyze pairs of symmetric states independently.
Let E be the set of states in which there is enforcement in the model without trade policy. If trade
policy is to have positive e⁄ects, these must come from an improvement in enforcement in states
s = 2 E. We consider these states ￿rst. In addition, trade policy might have negative e⁄ects by
a⁄ecting enforcement or goods trade in states s 2 E. We consider these states second.
If state s = 2 E, in the model without trade policy there is no enforcement and goods trade is
allowed. It is clear that in the model with trade policy this policy outcome is also an equilibrium.
The reason is that in the absence of enforcement there is no reason to interfere in goods trade.
Can enforcement be gained by prohibiting goods trade? Conjecture that during youth individuals
expect that the government of the rich region will prohibit goods trade in state s. In this case, there
would be no trade in state-s securities between residents of di⁄erent regions. But, then, during
old age the government of the rich region would ￿nd it optimal to allow goods trade. The reason
is that it is not necessary to impose trade restrictions to avoid foreign payments and, by allowing
46In reality, governments clearly have a richer set of policy options. In particular, they may impose trade restrictions
that are non-prohibitive and vary across goods. Analyzing this wider range of options involves a number of subtle
e⁄ects that we prefer to avoid given the scope of the paper.
47Of course, this would not be the case if governments had commitment over trade policy. Then, globalization
would never lower welfare. However, we do not consider realistic to assume that governments have commitment over
some policies but not others.
34goods trade, domestic residents would gain from ex-post trade in goods. As a result, enforcement
cannot be gained by prohibiting goods trade.48 This shows that trade policy has no e⁄ects in states
in which there is no enforcement in the absence of trade policy.
If state s 2 E, in the model without trade policy there is enforcement and goods trade is
allowed. Is this policy outcome still an equilibrium when there is trade policy? At ￿rst, it might
seem that this need not be the case, since the government of the rich region might have incentives
to prohibit goods trade to avoid payments to foreigners. However, there is always a distribution of
asset holdings such that this incentive is not strong enough to warrant the losses associated with
trade disruption. In particular, consider the case in which all payments to foreigners are owed
by a small subset of domestic residents, which we can think of as ￿intermediaries.￿ 49 In this case,
even if prohibiting goods trade leads to non-payment to foreigners, the bene￿t of this can be made
arbitrarily small by reducing the subset of intermediaries.50 As a result, both enforcement and
goods trade are maintained. This shows that trade policy has no e⁄ects in states in which there is
enforcement in the absence of trade policy.
This discussion shows that when governments have no commitment they cannot use trade policy
to ￿ght back the potentially negative e⁄ects of globalization, and the results of the model remain
unchanged.
5 Final Remarks
This paper has developed a novel theory of endogenous asset market incompleteness based on
sovereign risk. The key innovation is our assumption that governments cannot discriminate between
domestic and foreign creditors when choosing enforcement. Previous theory had instead assumed
that governments can perfectly discriminate between domestic and foreign creditors. This change
of assumption has important implications:
￿ If a country can perfectly discriminate between domestic and foreign creditors, sovereign
risk keeps all asset markets open but geographically segmented. Domestic asset trade is not
a⁄ected by sovereign risk and can only be limited by other ￿nancial market imperfections.
48The only case in which the government would (weakly) prefer to prohibit goods trade is when the relative
production in the two regions is the same for all tradable goods since in this case there is no scope for goods trade.
Only in this knife-edge case can trade policy lead to enforcement and, thus, the maintainance of domestic risk sharing.
49It is easy to show that if there exists an equilibrium with enforcement in some state s, there also exists an
equilibrium with enforcement in state s in which all foreign payments are made by an arbitrarily small subset of
domestic residents I1. To see this, start from the ￿rst equilibrium and replace any foreign payment by residents i = 2 I1
with a payment from i to some i
0 2 I1 and a foreign payment by i
0.
50This is because the increase in average utility resulting from not making foreign payments goes to zero as the
size of the subset of intermediaries goes to zero. However, this would not be the case if limc!1 u
0 (c) > 0.
35International asset trade is not feasible unless the country can o⁄er some collateral.51 In-
creases in collateral should improve international risk sharing, without a⁄ecting domestic risk
sharing. Reductions in trade costs improve the functioning of goods markets without a⁄ecting
the functioning of asset markets, and always raise welfare.52
￿ If a country cannot discriminate between domestic and foreign creditors, sovereign risk closes
some asset markets but keeps those that are open global. Even in the absence of other ￿nancial
market imperfections, domestic asset trade is limited. Even in the absence of collateral, some
international asset trade is possible. Increases in collateral should improve both international
and domestic risk sharing. Reductions in trade costs improve the functioning of goods markets
but might either improve or worsen the functioning of asset markets, and the e⁄ects on welfare
can go either way.
Therefore, our assumption of no discrimination: (i) provides a new explanation for why countries
can borrow abroad; (ii) shows that there are crucial interactions between domestic and international
asset trade; and (iii) accounts for much richer e⁄ects of globalization on risk sharing. In addition,
the assumption of no discrimination seems to us more realistic than the previous one of perfect
discrimination. Although reality surely lies somewhere between these two polar cases, we argued
in the introduction that the institutional setup of international borrowing during the 1990￿ s and
2000￿ s is one in which governments ￿nd it di¢ cult to discriminate between domestic and foreign
creditors.
What is the e⁄ect of globalization on risk sharing and welfare? As in standard analyses, global-
ization increases goods trade and the scope for international risk sharing, leading to the standard
gains from trade. However, we ￿nd that globalization might also reduce enforcement and increase
market incompleteness. This worsens risk sharing and creates costs that might ￿ or might not￿
outweigh the standard gains from trade. This result depends crucially on the behavior of the
terms of trade, and applies even if we allow markets and governments to react optimally to the
51We use here a broad concept of collateral. This concept includes the narrow view of collateral, i.e. the value of
the real assets that foreign creditors can directly seize in the event of default. It also includes the e⁄ects of default
penalties, i.e. the value of the payments that foreign creditors can elicit through the threat of applying penalties of
various sorts. Conceptually, narrow collateral and penalties play the same role in the theory and therefore makes
sense to treat them jointly.
52The trade theorist will immediately recognize that this statement needs a few words of quali￿cation. In the
model of this paper, globalization with perfect discrimination would raise the ex-ante welfare of all regions because
they are ex-ante identical and a reduction in trade costs has no ex-ante terms-of-trade e⁄ects. With asymmetric
regions, it is possible to construct examples in which there are ex-ante terms-of-trade e⁄ects that lead some regions
to gain and some to lose as a result of globalization. But even in this case, the world as a whole would still gain
from globalization and, as a result, there would always exist a set of (international) ex-ante transfers that ensure
that globalization leads to a Pareto-improvement. See Ventura (2005) for a comprehensive analysis of the e⁄ects of
globalization (as modelled here) on trade, growth and welfare.
36changes brought about by globalization. The reason is that globalization increases the severity of
the underlying friction, namely, sovereign risk.
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Appendix A: Construction of the sovereign risk equilibrium
In this appendix, we construct the sovereign risk equilibrium used in the text. With complete
markets, there are equilibria that share the same prices and quantities, but di⁄er in the distribution
of assets among individuals. This multiplicity is clearly irrelevant since it does not matter whose
assets an individual holds. With sovereign risk, the distribution of assets may be relevant since it
can a⁄ect the governments￿incentives to enforce payments ex-post. To simplify the exposition, we
impose the condition that there be no state in which Home residents receive payments from Foreign




i2IF xH;is is zero
for all s 2 S. This restriction is without loss of generality since it can be easily shown that if a
given allocation can be supported as an equilibrium in which this condition is not satis￿ed, then
this allocation can also be supported as an equilibrium in which this condition is satis￿ed.
It follows from the symmetry assumption that we can analyze pairs of symmetric states indepen-
dently. For each pair of symmetric states s and s0 there are three possible symmetric enforcement
levels: (i) both regions enforce: s 2 EH \ EF and s0 2 EH \ EF; (ii) one region enforces: either
41s 2 EF ￿ EH and s0 2 EH ￿ EF, or s 2 EH ￿ EF and s0 2 EF ￿ EH; and (iii) no region enforces:
s = 2 EH [ EF and s0 = 2 EH [ EF. We construct the best symmetric equilibrium and this is the one
in which enforcement levels are as high as possible. To ￿nd this equilibrium, we take each pair of
symmetric states s and s0 and follow three steps:
STEP 1: We check whether in equilibrium both regions can enforce payments simultaneously.53
Assume this is the case. Then, asset holdings are as in the complete-markets model and consump-
tions are given by Equation (14). Using these consumption allocations and the fact that utility is


























A for all j 2 fH;Fg,
where yNj
stands for the value of income in case of unexpected non-enforcement by the government
of region j. The left hand side measures the loss in average utility that results from a breakdown
in domestic risk sharing in region j, while the right hand side measures the gains in average utility
that result from not paying debts to foreigners. The left hand side is nonnegative for both regions,
while the right hand side is zero for the poor (or creditor) region and positive for the rich (or debtor)
region. Therefore, the poor region has no incentive to deviate. Has the rich region an incentive
to deviate? Let R be the rich region. Since nobody in this region holds assets issued by residents
of the poor region, i.e. xP;is = 0 for all i 2 IR, individual and regional incomes of the rich region
if it deviates are obtained by setting xis = 0 in Equations (7) and (8). If, given these values of
productions, the Equation above holds we conclude that the government of the rich region enforces
payments. In this case, s 2 EH \ EF and xis = yW
s ￿ yis for all i 2 IW. Otherwise, we move to
the next step.
STEP 2: We check whether the poor region enforces payments, even though the rich region does
not. Assume this is the case. Since the rich region does not enforce payments, there are some
residents of this region that would like to sell assets but cannot do so. Typically, there are also
some ￿poor￿ residents of the rich region that purchase assets from ￿rich￿ residents of the poor
region. Therefore, the rich region becomes the creditor while the poor region becomes the debtor.











if i 2 IR
yP
s + xP
s ￿ yis if i 2 IP
53Since states s and s
0 are symmetric, we just perform these steps on state s.
42and the market clearing condition in Equation (11). These asset holdings imply that there is full risk
sharing among those individuals for which the borrowing constraint is not binding. This includes
all residents of the poor region and the ￿poor￿residents of the rich region. The ￿rich￿residents of
the rich region are forced to consume all of their production. Substituting these asset holdings into
Equations (6), (7) and (8), we obtain incomes and consumption allocations. Moreover, this allows
































Once again, the left hand side measures the loss in average utility that results from a breakdown
in domestic risk sharing in the poor region, while the right hand side measures the gains in average
utility that result from not paying debts to residents of the rich region. Both the left and right hand
sides are nonnegative. Since residents of the rich region cannot sell assets, individual and regional
incomes of the poor region if it deviates are obtained by setting xis = 0 in Equations (7) and (8).
If, given these values of productions, the condition above holds, we conclude that s 2 EP ￿ER and
asset holdings are determined as described above. Otherwise, we move to the next step.
STEP 3: If we arrive to this step, it means that none of the regions enforce payments and we
conclude that s = 2 EH [ EF and xis = 0 for all i 2 IW and j 2 fH;Fg. We then obtain incomes
and consumption allocations by substituting these asset holdings into Equations (6), (7) and (8).
This procedure delivers the best equilibrium. This follows from two observations. First, the
enforcement level in a given pair of states does not a⁄ect enforcement or welfare in any other pair
of states. This is because we focus on symmetric equilibria and in all of them the relative wealth
of individuals is the same. Second, the welfare in any pair of states increases with the enforcement
level. This is because there are gains from trade and the larger the number of markets the more of
these gains individuals reap.
We can generate other symmetric equilibria by switching the order in which we perform the
three steps above. For instance, moving step one to the end and then alternating between starting
the procedure in steps two and three generates equilibria in which there is at least one missing
market. Or moving step two to the end and then alternating between starting the procedure in
steps one and three generates equilibria in which there are either two open markets or none.54
54Following this procedure until we have tried all possible orderings allows us to construct all symmetric equilibria
except for those in which the rich region enforces but the poor region does not. If we added an additional step in
which we checked whether the rich region enforces payments while the poor region does not, the procedure would
generate the entire set of symmetric equilibria.
43Appendix B: Penalties and reputation
In this appendix, we extend our model by introducing default ￿penalties,￿which can take the form
of the seizure of valuable collateral, the application of trade embargoes, or the loss of reputation.
We show that such penalties can improve enforcement and lower market incompleteness to some
extent, but none of the qualitative results described in the previous sections are a⁄ected.
Assume that the government of region j 2 fH;Fg su⁄ers a penalty ￿
j
s if it defaults on payments
to foreigners in state s 2 S. Also assume that ￿
j
s satis￿es the same between-region symmetry condi-
tions that productions satisfy. Furthermore, to preserve the competitive nature of the equilibrium,
assume that penalties are conditional on default taking place on a positive measure of payments.
Equilibrium consumption allocations are still given by Equations (24) and (25) and welfare
is still given by equation (27). The only di⁄erence is that the enforcement set now depends on
penalties, i.e. E(f￿H
s ;￿F
s gs2S). For short, we shall write E (￿) and E(0) to denote the enforcement
sets with and without default penalties respectively. Therefore, we replace Equation (28) with
E (￿) =
￿










s can be a direct penalty that each government can impose on the other govern-
ment if it defaults. It can also be a cost associated with disruptions in trade in goods if governments



























0 ￿is(z) ￿ dz. The ￿rst term, which is positive, represents the losses due to having to
consume tradable goods in proportion to their domestic production as opposed to world production.
The second term, which might be positive or negative, represents the changes in domestic inequality
as a result of the changes in goods prices that results from closing down trade in goods. In general,
we would expect the ￿rst term to dominate and trade sanctions to have its usual positive e⁄ects
on enforcement. We can calculate ￿R
s for each state using Equation (38) and then replace it in
Equation (37) to ￿nd the enforcement set E(￿).
The two interpretations of exogenous penalties and trade sanctions have the problem that
governments must either be ￿forced￿to impose the penalties if and only if defaults takes place or
else have access to a technology that would let them commit ex-ante to impose the penalties if and
only if default takes place.
A more common way of endogenizing ￿
j
s is to assume that governments play a repeated game
44and then focus on reputational equilibria. For instance, assume that governments agree to enforce
if s 2 E(￿) and that, if one deviates, they revert to the one-stage Nash equilibrium analyzed in the
rest of the paper in which governments only enforce if s 2 E(0) ￿ E(￿). The discount factor is
















The two terms inside the bracket, which are positive, represent the future losses in international
and domestic risk sharing in the states in which enforcement is lost respectively.55 To ￿nd the
reputational equilibria we must ￿nd ￿xed points (￿;E) of the mapping given by Equations (37)
and (39). The best reputational equilibrium can be found with the following procedure. Set
E1 = S. Find ￿1 and eliminate from E1 those states for which the enforcement condition is not
satis￿ed, obtaining a new E2 ￿ E1. Find ￿2 2 [0;￿1] and eliminate from E2 those states for
which the enforcement condition is not satis￿ed, obtaining a new E3 ￿ E2. And so on. Since
this is a contraction mapping the procedure must converge. That it converges to the best possible
reputational equilibrium follows from the fact that if the enforcement condition fails for a state at
any iteration it will fail for all later iterations since the condition gets tougher to satisfy as states
are eliminated and, thus, the cost of default becomes lower.
The introduction of default penalties does not a⁄ect signi￿cantly the e⁄ects of globalization on
risk sharing and welfare. In the case of exogenous penalties, they increase the bene￿t of enforce-
ment by an amount independent of ￿, delaying the disappearance of markets and hastening their
reappearance. For example, consider the case of no terms-of-trade e⁄ects that was illustrated in
Figure 1. In the top panel, the bene￿t of enforcement shifts up by an amount equal to the default
penalty. As a result, when generation t￿
s + 1 arrives, asset trade does not disappear. Instead,
asset markets remain open and welfare keeps increasing until a later time at which international
payments become so large that they more than compensate for both the destruction of domestic
payments and the default penalty.
When penalties take the form of disruptions in goods trade, the size of the penalties depend on
the types and fraction of goods that are tradable. For example, in the case of no terms-of-trade
trade sanctions have no e⁄ect whatsoever because there are no incentives to trade in goods. In the
case of regional terms-of-trade that was illustrated in Figure 3 trade sanctions do have important
55There are two points worth noting. First, we have assumed that the reputational loss of default is not a function
of the state s. Second, we have also assumed that ￿ is constant over time. Both assumptions are common in the
literature and it is straightforward to see that none of the qualitative results would be a⁄ected if we relaxed either
one of them.
45e⁄ects. In the top panel, the bene￿t of enforcement is not a⁄ected for low values of ￿ since there are
no incentives to trade these goods internationally. Beyond ￿ = 0:5, on the other hand, the bene￿ts
of enforcement increase with ￿ as regions start trading in goods. As a result, ￿￿
s is una⁄ected but
￿￿￿
s decreases. The e⁄ects of globalization are now as follows. When generation t￿
s + 1 arrives,
asset markets still close for this pair of symmetric states. However, asset markets reopen before the
arrival of generation t￿￿
s + 1. This example illustrates a more general point. The times at which
markets appear and disappear are not much a⁄ected for low values of ￿. However, for higher values
of ￿ markets disappear later and reappear sooner.
When penalties take the form of losses of reputation the analysis is more involved. First, note
that Equation (39) is correct only when ￿ increases very slowly. Even in this case, the value of
reputation may either increase or decrease with ￿, depending on how it a⁄ects the values under
cooperation and non-cooperation. When ￿ increases faster, Equation (39) must be replaced by one
that correctly accounts for the net present value of reputation. We conjecture that, relative to the
case of slow globalization, faster globalization hastens both the disappearance and reappearance of
markets.
Interestingly, although the introduction of penalties does not a⁄ect qualitatively our results,
our model suggests a new potential bene￿t from a strengthening of penalties. In our model default
penalties not only improve international risk sharing but also domestic risk sharing. This is in sharp
contrast with previous literature that assumed that countries can discriminate between domestic
and foreign creditors. In this literature, asset markets are geographically segmented and there is
perfect domestic risk sharing. Increases in penalties increase international risk sharing, but have
no e⁄ect on domestic risk sharing.
Appendix C: Equilibrium with optimal borrowing limits
In this appendix, we analyze the equilibrium with optimal borrowing limits. Instead of ￿nding the
optimal issuance rights directly, we ￿rst ￿nd the optimal issuance rights prices f￿sgs2S. Given these





maxf0;￿xisg for all s 2 S and j 2 fH;Fg.
As before, we can analyze pairs of symmetric states independently. To simplify the analysis of
the e⁄ects of globalization and make it comparable to those in Section 3, we assume that either
there is enforcement in both regions or there is not enforcement in either region. We only consider
46cases in which the issuance rights prices in the poor region are ￿P
s = 0. This condition will be
satis￿ed at the optimum because it is the government of the rich region which might have ex-post
incentives not to enforce payments. So let us denote the issuance rights prices in the rich region by
￿s. Equilibrium in asset markets in state s is characterized by
xis =
8
> > > <
> > > :























s ￿ yis if yis < yP
s + xP
s




s ￿ yis if s 2 E for all i 2 IP, (41)
and xis = 0 if s = 2 E for all i 2 IW; and the asset market clearing condition xR
s + xP
s = 0.
These conditions imply that, when there is enforcement, the richest residents of the rich region
make payments to the poorest residents of the rich region and to the residents of the poor region.
Borrowing limits introduce a wedge between the ex-post incomes of individuals in these two groups.
Whether or not there is enforcement in state s depends on asset holdings, which in turn depend
on borrowing limits. Let xis(￿s) be the amount of assets individual i purchases when issuance rights
prices are ￿s, if all individuals expect enforcement. Then xP
s (￿s) ￿
R
i2IP xis(￿s) is a decreasing
function of ￿s. This is because, as ￿s increases, both the set of richest residents in the rich region
who want to sell assets and the amount of assets that each such resident wants to sell decreases.
It also follows that xP
s (￿s) is continuous in ￿s and that there exists a high enough ￿s such that
xP
s (￿s) = 0. Let us de￿ne ￿ ￿s ￿ min
￿
￿s : xP
s (￿s) = 0
￿
, which we call the prohibitive issuance rights
price for state s. Let ￿E






s (enforce) + ￿s ￿ vR
s (not enforce) when xis = xis(￿s) for i 2 IW￿
for all s 2 S.
Let the optimal issuance rights price be denoted ￿￿
s. Then [￿ ￿s;1) ￿ ￿E
s and, since the optimal
issuance rights prices are those that maximize asset trade, ￿￿
s ￿ ￿ ￿s. The optimal issuance rights
price will be such that there is enforcement in all states except in those in which the issuance
rights prices need to be so large for enforcement that no issuance takes place (i.e. ￿E
s = [￿ ￿s;1) and



























) : i 2 IR￿
￿ 0
for all s 2 S.
47Clearly, ￿￿
s = 0 for those states in which there was enforcement in the equilibrium without
borrowing limits, and ￿￿
s 2 [0;￿ ￿s] for the other states. If mini2IR fxis(0)g < xP
s (0), then when
￿s = ￿ ￿s there are no payments to residents of the poor region while there are payments from the
richest residents of the rich region to the poorest residents of the rich region. As a result, the
government of the rich region strictly prefers to enforce payments. By continuity, ￿￿
s < ￿ ￿s. As a
result, if mini2IR fxis(0)g < xP
s (0) ex-ante utility is strictly higher with optimal borrowing limits
than without them. In addition, there is some international sharing of goods since xP
s (￿￿
s) > 0.
If mini2IR fxis(0)g ￿ xP
s (0), then when ￿s = ￿ ￿s there are neither payments to residents of the
poor region nor payments to the poorest resident of the rich region. Whether or not there exists
an issuance rights price ￿s < ￿ ￿s such that there is enforcement depends on the distribution of
individual shocks in the rich region and the fraction of goods that are tradable ￿. In all cases, even
with optimal borrowing limits sovereign risk still leads to imperfect domestic and international
sharing of goods.
Appendix D: Public debt
In this appendix, we introduce public debt. This allows governments to address the problem
of private overborrowing by replacing private borrowing with public debt. Assume that at the
beginning of youth governments issue contingent public debt. Governments choose the number of
public bonds contingent on each state of nature, denoted bj;s for s 2 S and j 2 fH;Fg, which
they distribute equally among their domestic residents. Assume for now that governments prohibit
agents from trading private assets. During old age, instead of an enforcement choice, governments
choose whether to repay their debt or not. If a government chooses to repay, it imposes non-
distortionary lump-sum taxes on its domestic residents tj;s = bj;s. If a government chooses not to
repay, taxes tj;s = 0. The governments￿budget constraints during old age are then given by
tj;s = ej;s ￿ bj;s for all s 2 S and j 2 fH;Fg, (42)
where e
j
s is an indicator variable that takes value one if government j repays its debt and zero
otherwise. We assume that governments cannot discriminate among domestic residents when im-
posing taxes and cannot discriminate between domestic and foreign residents when repaying its
debt. During youth, agents trade in a market for government debt, selling bonds that pay in states
in which their production is high and buying bonds that pay in states in which it is low.












s ￿ bj(i);s for all i 2 IW, (43)
where bj;is denotes the number of public bonds that pay in state s issued by government j held by
individual i after the market for public debt closes, q
j
s denotes the price of public bonds that pay in
state s issued by government j, and we used the fact that before the market for public debt opens
individual i holds bj(i);s bonds that pay in state s. The market clearing conditions in Equation (22)
are replaced by Z
i2IW
bj;is = bj;s for all s 2 S and j 2 fH;Fg. (44)
Finally, the budget constraints of old individuals re￿ ect both payments from holding public










s ￿b￿j(i);is for all s 2 S and i 2 IW, (45)
where we used the fact that governments can default on their debts and also the governments￿
budget constraint in Equation (42) to ￿nd taxes.
Note that a higher level of public debt leads in principle to more risk sharing (conditional on
repayment) since it allows individuals to make higher payments in more states. At one extreme, if
bj;s = 0 residents of region j cannot make any payment in state s. At the other extreme, if bj;s is
very high residents of j can make very high payments. Public debt issuance thus plays a similar
role as issuance rights in the previous section.
As before, we can analyze pairs of symmetric states independently. To simplify the analysis of
the e⁄ects of globalization and make it comparable to those in Section 3, we will assume that either
both governments repay or neither does. With some abuse of notation, we will denote the set of
states in which both governments repay as E. We will only consider cases in which the government
of the poor region issues enough public debt so that their residents are unconstrained in the amount
of payments they make during old age. This condition will be satis￿ed at the optimum because
it is the government of the poor region which might have ex-post incentives not to repay its debt.







s + (bR;s ￿ bP;s) ￿ yis
yP
s + bP
s + (bR;s ￿ bP;s) ￿ yis if yis < yP
s + bP
s + (bR;s ￿ bP;s)




s ￿ yis if s 2 E and i 2 IP, (47)
and bis undetermined if s = 2 E for all i 2 IW; and the asset market clearing condition bR
s + bP
s =





yis ￿ bR;s if yP
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if yis < yP
s + bP
s + (bR;s ￿ bP;s)







if s 2 E for all i 2 IP, (49)
and cis = yis if s = 2 E for all i 2 IW. This shows that the richer residents of the rich region make
payments (through taxes) to the poorer residents of the rich region and to the residents of the poor
region.
In principle, we could do a full analysis of the case of optimal public debt policy. However,
it is easy to see that in terms of sharing of goods and welfare it falls in between the cases of no
ex-ante policies and optimal borrowing limits. With respect to the case of no ex-ante policies,
it is easy to see that for states in which there would be enforcement with private debt the same
outcome can be obtained by setting bj;s high enough (in particular, as high as the largest payment
a domestic resident would have made in that state). In addition, in states in which there would not
be enforcement, it is sometimes possible to get some asset trade with public debt. With respect to
the case of optimal borrowing limits, in states in which enforcement is gained with both optimal
public debt and optimal borrowing limits the outcome with optimal public debt is no better and
in general worse than the outcome with optimal borrowing limits. This is because with optimal
borrowing limits payments are made by the richest residents of the rich region (and, among these,
the higher the value of production the higher the payment). This is re￿ ected in the fact that
consumption levels are equalized among the richest residents of the rich region. With optimal
public debt, however, residents are constrained in the payments the can make by the size of taxes.
This constraint binds for the richest residents and that is why consumption levels are not equalized
among them. In addition, since the resulting domestic sharing of goods is worse with public debt,
government have fewer incentives to tax and pay the debt held by domestic residents and, thus,
50there are some states in which enforcement is gained with optimal borrowing limits but not with
optimal public debt.
Finally, is it possible to obtain a better outcome by allowing private markets to operate in
parallel with public debt markets? The answer is no. First, in states in which borrowing needs to
be constrained for enforcement to take place agents cannot expect enforcement of private contracts
and repayment of government debt. If they did, the outcome would be as in the complete markets
case and, thus, ex-post governments would prefer not to enforce private payments and/or not
to repay government debt. Second, in these states agents cannot expect enforcement of private
contracts and no repayment of public debt for the same reason. So even if governments allowed
private markets, they would be irrelevant in states in which borrowing needs to be constrained. In
other states, optimal public debt can be partly or even totally replaced by private assets without















This case is constructed with one pair of symmetric states and no terms-of-trade effects. The regional component of































These panels illustrate the effects of globalization on welfare with many pairs of symmetric states. The top panel uses
uniformly distributed pairs of states (14 for the jagged line and 20,000 for the smooth line) with a large mass of states
satisfying .Thebottompanelisconstructed
withthesamenumberofstatesasbeforebutdistributedaccordingtoasinusoidalprobabilitydensityfunction.
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This case illustrates the behavior of the model with regional terms-of-trade effects and one pair of symmetric states. The
regional component of production is characterized by (L)=1.58.
Thereisnoindividualriskinthepoor region.
f
R The individual component of production satisfies





























states. The regional component of production is characterized by (L)=1.58. The individual component of production in
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Figure 5
This figure replicates the examples presented in figures 1, 3 and 4  with optimal borrowing limits
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No terms-of-trade eﬀects Regional terms-of-trade eﬀects Regional and individual terms-of-trade eﬀects